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THE BENEFITS AND DANGERS OF PROPORTIONALITY 
REVIEW IN ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
In the landmark case Beit Sourik Village Council vs. the Government of 
Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ), 
grappled with a highly charged question: should a state have to sacrifice its 
own security to improve human rights?1 The Court answered in the affirmative 
and held that certain sections of Israel’s controversial security fence could not 
be built as planned.2 In these sections, the loss of human rights outweighed the 
security benefit of placing the fence through certain villages.3 Scholars from 
both sides of the political spectrum have voiced strong opinions about this 
case,4 and many of these debates have centered on the determinative aspect of 
the case: the court’s proportionality review.5 This Comment will not grapple 
with politics, nor will it focus exclusively on the Beit Sourik case. Rather, it 
will analyze this case and similar cases to argue about the theoretical 
implications of proportionality review in HCJ decisions. Through an analysis 
of these cases, this Comment will determine the best way that a court could 
grapple with the issue of balancing security and the right to life and bodily 
integrity against other human rights. 
This Comment argues that the method of proportionality analysis 
implemented in earlier HCJ decisions should have been implemented in later 
decisions where the Court balanced the property, dignity, and free movement 
rights of West Bank Palestinians against the security, right to life, and bodily 
integrity rights of Israeli citizens. In earlier cases, notably Horev v. The 
Minister of Transportation, the Court evaluated and weighed the conflicting 
 
 1 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 24 [2004], http://elyon1.court.gov. 
il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf. The Court stated that as a general principle, the HCJ would 
require the government to implement an alternate act, “whose [security] benefit will be somewhat smaller than 
that of the former one,” if the alternate act “ensures a substantial reduction in the injury caused by the 
administrative act.” Id. 
 2 Id. at 30–43. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme 
Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38 ISR. L. REV. 262 (2005); Aeyal M. Gross, The 
Construction of a Wall Between The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law 
and the Structure of Occupation, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 393, 395 (2006) (arguing for greater human rights); Jason 
Litwack, A Disproportionate Ruling for all the Right Reasons, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 857 (2006) (arguing for 
greater security).  
 5 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 263. 
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rights in a systematic and consistent way before proceeding to balance those 
rights against one another.6 This method ensured that the balancing was rooted 
in legal precedent and rationality. However, in later decisions balancing the 
right to life and bodily integrity against other rights, the Court demonstrated a 
less disciplined approach where it balanced the conflicting rights without 
determining the comparative value of those rights beforehand.7 This Comment 
argues that in these later decisions, the Court should have more carefully 
evaluated the relative value of the conflicting rights before proceeding to 
balance them against each other. 
Part I of this Comment presents a brief overview of proportionality review 
and its benefits. Part II analyzes an earlier HCJ decision to show how it 
demonstrates those benefits, and also how it employs proportionality in a way 
that should have been employed in later decisions. Finally, Part III examines 
later HCJ decisions that weigh the right to life and bodily integrity against 
other human rights. It will critically examine the reasoning in these cases and 
argue that the Court should have followed precedent and evaluated the relative 
importance of the conflicting rights before beginning its proportionality 
review. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PROPORTIONALITY 
Proportionality review is a “widely diffused . . . [o]verarching principle of 
constitutional adjudication” that courts worldwide use to balance conflicting 
rights claims.8 Proportionality review comes into play when a government 
limits an individual’s rights for a supposedly more important public right.9 
Through this review, courts determine whether the government or legislative 
body properly compared the benefit of the public good against the detriment to 
 
 6 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 211 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 153/83 Levi v. 
Commissioner of the Israel Police Southern District 38(2) PD 393, 401−02 (“The variety of potential situations 
necessitates a multi-shaded balancing approach. We must refrain from adopting a single standard for all 
matters . . . conflicting interests are not always of identical normative import.”)), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ 
files_eng/96/160/050/A01/96050160.a01.htm. 
 7 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 443 [2004] (Isr.), http://www.dindayan.com/ 
rulings/02104970.r15.pdf. 
 8 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008) (alteration in original).  
 9 See, e.g., Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
5 (1979) (balancing the right to a non-prejudiced trial through limitation on the freedom of press against the 
freedom of press). 
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individual or group rights, and if not, it will rule the act unconstitutional.10 The 
method has become so popular and widespread that it “has come to dominate 
the dockets of constitutional and supreme courts around the world,”11 so much 
so that theorists claim that a pervasive “balancing consciousness” has replaced 
the question of whether to balance individuals rights against government action 
with the sole question of how to balance properly.12 
Israel has been recognized as a world leader in consistently employing 
proportionality review in constitutional disputes. As early as 1992,13 Israel’s 
HCJ has applied the principle of proportionality to hold that any government 
action that limits human rights must be proportional to the detriment to human 
rights; or, in other words, that “a decision of an administrative authority must 
reach a reasonable balance between communal needs and the damage done to 
the individual.”14 The HCJ’s version of the proportionality test breaks down 
into three parts. First, the Court determines whether the action had a rational 
connection to the government’s stated purpose (the “rational means test”).15 
Next, the Court determines if the government employed the least restrictive 
means possible to achieve the stated goal (the “least injurious means test”).16 
Finally, the Court determines if there were alternative measures that would 
have achieved a slightly diminished version of the goal while significantly 
reducing damage to the other party’s rights.17 The Court has called this last test 
the “proportionate means” test, or “proportionality in the narrow sense.”18 This 
 
 10 See Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 75–76 (“the analysis involves . . . judicial verification that, 
with respect to the act in question, the means adopted by the government are rationally related to stated policy 
objectives . . . [Next] the judge ensures that the measure does not curtail the right any more than is necessary 
for the government to achieve its stated goals . . . The last stage, ‘balancing in the strict sense,’ is also known 
as ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’ . . . In the balancing phase, the judge weighs the benefits of the act—
which has already been determined to have been ‘narrowly tailored,’ in American parlance—against the costs 
incurred by infringement of the right, in order to determine which ‘constitutional value’ shall prevail, in light 
of the respective importance of the values in tension, given the facts.” (alteration in original)). 
 11 Id. at 74.  
 12 Iddo Porat, The Dual Mode of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional 
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2006). See also Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 76 (2008) (“In 
many polities today, proportionality is treated as a taken-for-granted feature of constitutionalism, or a criterion 
for the perfection of the ‘rule of law.’”). 
 13 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel 1, 23 [2004] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 987/94 
Euronet Golden Lines [1992]), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf. 
 14 Id. at 34.  
 15 Id. at 24. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Id.  
 18 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 1, 25 [2004] (alteration in 
original). 
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last test represents the upper limit of judicial activism in constitutional law in 
the world.19 The Court recognizes a legitimate governmental goal that could 
not have been performed with any less damage, yet the Court may require a 
different action to increase the rights of the damaged party.20 
Israel is not the only nation that employs proportionality review that 
includes the third narrow proportionality test.21 Proportionality review has 
“spread like wildfire” to become a powerful and influential constitutional 
doctrine worldwide.22 One scholar described proportionality as “the central 
standard today for judicial decisions dealing with competing values and 
interests in the public law of many democratic states.”23 Yet, scholars have 
recognized the State of Israel as a worldwide leader of proportionality review 
in constitutional issues;24 one scholar argues that the Israeli Supreme Court 
applies proportionality “more consistently and rigorously than any other 
judicial body in the world.”25 
Despite the virtues of proportionality review in general,26 some scholars, 
such as Moshe Cohen-Eliya, have argued that the HCJ sometimes oversteps its 
bounds and applies the test in inappropriate ways, especially in regards to the 
third test.27 According to Cohen-Eliya, the third proportionality test may 
present a “lack of democratic legitimacy in the granting of sweeping powers to 
judges to weigh the balance between societal goals and individual rights.”28 
Rhis sort of balancing properly belongs with a democratically elected 
government, he argues, and not with democratically unaccountable judges.29 
 
 19 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 79. (“[S]o many new courts, operating in environments 
traditionally hostile to judicial review, have so quickly and successfully embraced what is, inarguably, the 
most intrusive form of review found anywhere.”). 
 20 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel PD 24 [2004] 
 21 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 74−75. 
 22 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Justification, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 458, 461 
(2014). 
 23 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 264. 
 24 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 132. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 459, 462. 
 27 Moshe Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 265. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id.  
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A. Positive Aspects of Proportionality 
Despite the dangers of proportionality, the doctrine, when properly used, 
offers substantial benefits to democratic societies.30 In Israel and abroad, these 
benefits have included an expanded array of protected rights, which results in a 
diffusion of political strife as less popular rights nevertheless draw judicial 
protection. Proportionality review also creates a constitutional culture that 
holds government accountable for theoretically any limitation on rights. This 
culture thereby prevents government institutions from deflecting judicial 
scrutiny by hiding within “legal black holes,” or limitations on rights held as 
“off limits” from judicial scrutiny. Finally, proportionality review allows for a 
second look from judges, wherein legally trained eyes can critique and 
improve on the way that the executive or legislative branch chose to limit some 
rights for the sake of others. 
1. Expanded Array of Rights 
Proportionality review allows judges to reconsider the balancing of rights 
that elected officials perform even when those officials stayed “in bounds” and 
did not breach a fundamental right.31 For instance, in Horev v. Minister of 
Transportation, the government allowed restrictions on a fundamental right—
freedom of movement—for the sake of protecting religious feelings (not 
freedom of worship), an admittedly non-fundamental right.32 
Proportionality review grows naturally out of an expanded set of 
constitutionally protected rights.33 According to Cohen-Eliya and Porat, “the 
broader the conception of rights becomes, the greater the likelihood that these 
rights will at some point conflict with other rights or interests; therefore there 
will be a need to balance the rights . . . in order to arrive at the most reasonable 
solution.”34 Thus, proportionality review allows judges to double-check the 
balancing already performed by officials in a theoretically limitless array of 
situations, not just those that involve the most fundamental rights. For instance, 
 
 30 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 461−62. 
 31 See e.g., HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’Am Company v. Minister of the Interior 2 [1953] (Isr.), http://www. 
dindayan.com/rulings/53000730.z01.pdf; HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Police Commander [1984] 
(Isr.), http://www.dindayan.com/rulings/83001530.z01.pdf (conflict between freedom of expression and 
preserving public peace).  
 32 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 246–47 [1997] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov. 
il/files_eng/96/160/050/A01/96050160.a01.htm. 
 33 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 481. 
 34 Id. (alteration in original). 
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the German Constitutional Court, one of the forerunners of proportionality 
analysis, considered riding horses in forested areas, feeding pigeons, smoking 
marijuana, and obtaining the permission to import certain breeds of dogs, as 
interests that should be protected as constitutional rights.35 Thus, 
proportionality review expands the rights that a national court will protect by 
affording protection for rights beyond strictly “fundamental rights.” 
By contrast, in the American constitutional system, one of the few 
jurisdictions that still does not fully use proportionality review,36 Supreme 
Court justices will only consider government infringement on rights preserved 
in the Bill of Rights or in Supreme Court jurisprudence that defines a given 
right as fundamental.37 American constitutional culture declares that 
government officials have the publicly granted right and authority to limit non-
fundamental rights; non-democratically elected judges have no power to 
second guess government decisions that steer clear of fundamental rights.38 If 
the American Supreme Court would choose to expand protected rights beyond 
only those “fundamental rights,” its analysis of upcoming cases could look 
different. In upcoming cases, the Court will analyze the issue of forcing 
objecting business owners to purchase insurance for contraception devices 
against their religious convictions.39 These cases may turn on whether forcing 
such insurance coverage is actually a violation of freedom of religion or 
another fundamental right. However, if the Court would employ a 
proportionality scheme that expands protected rights beyond strictly 
 
 35 Id. at 478−79.  
 36 Sweet & Matthews, supra note 8, at 74. 
 37 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (holding that right to privacy in 
marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution). 
 38 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra at 22, at 476 n.45, 479 (2011) (“A culture of authority implies a political 
division of labor: the existence of distinct institutions for distinct spheres of public life, each best equipped to 
act in its sphere, and accountable for its actions within that sphere.”). See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional 
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) 
(describing the U.S. governmental system as one “whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of 
powers”); see also Secretary of State v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47 ¶ 62 (“[I]n matters of national security, the 
cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to 
respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a 
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special 
information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for the 
community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the 
community through the democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, 
they must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can remove.”). 
 39 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the ‘contraception mandate’ threaten religious liberty, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemptions-from-the-contraception-
mandate-threaten-religious-liberty/2014/01/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html. 
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fundamental rights, then answering the question of whether forcing this 
insurance coverage breaches a fundamental right would not prevent the case 
from moving forward. 
2. A Second Look at Controversial Decisions 
Even when the American government tampers with a fundamental right, 
the Supreme Court’s greatest check on government power involves strict 
scrutiny, which requires that the ends are narrowly tailored to the means.40 
This compares to the “least restrictive means test”41 in proportionality: did the 
government achieve its compelling goal in a way that restricted rights in the 
least possible way?42 However, the American Supreme Court will not consider 
reducing that compelling goal if harm to rights can be further reduced.43 
This reluctance to reduce the government’s goal—in essence, this 
reluctance to correct the government on how it chooses to balance different 
rights and values—stems from the American “culture of authority,” where the 
Court authorizes narrowly tailored policy decisions on the theory that the 
American populace authorized their officials to make that balance.44 In a 
culture of authority, non-elected judges do not have the authority to reconsider 
balances between rights, and so they do not tamper with those who had the 
authority to make this balance.45 On the other hand, in nations that employ 
proportionality review, the Court has the freedom to re-evaluate controversial 
decisions of the executive or legislature to determine whether the government 
reached such decisions through rational deliberation or political coercion. 
 
 40 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997). 
 41 See, e.g., id. at 529. 
 42 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–43 (2003) (holding that considering race in school 
admissions passes the least restrictive means tests where the purpose is to achieve student body diversity, 
which is a compelling state interest). 
 43 But see Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[The Court] has examined the restrictions’ proportionality, the relation between restriction and objective, the 
fit between ends and means.”). 
 44 Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, supra note 22, at 475. But see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of 
Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 207 [1997] (Isr.) (“[A] democratic system prioritizes human rights above all 
else. Democracy is not merely formal democracy—the ‘rule book conception,’ according to which decisions 
are left to majority will. Rather, democracy is substantive—the ‘rights conception,’ according to which the 
majority is precluded from infringing on human rights.”). 
 45 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 479. 
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3. Diffusing Political Strife 
By expanding the set of protected rights, proportionality review also helps 
diffuse national political strife. A constitutional court may be drawn to usurp 
certain “foreign” rights for the sake of other more homegrown rights based on 
text, tradition, and the authority of democratically elected officials.46 When 
certain values categorically trump others, the losing party feels unrepresented 
and perhaps disrespected.47 By requiring a balance of all values and rights, 
proportionality review prevents certain more culturally entrenched rights from 
swallowing newer, imported rights and needs.48 Proportionality review thereby 
diffuses politically charged conflicts by examining the facts and circumstances 
of every case where rights have been limited and avoids “rhetorical 
exaggeration” of which right a society cherishes more.49 
In a related way, proportionality review diffuses political strife by 
transforming a debate about values into a rational trade-off between factual 
issues.50 For example, the Sunday Times Case, heard in the European Court of 
Human Rights, balanced the right of the government to prevent the publication 
of information that would prejudice an ongoing lawsuit with the principle of 
freedom of expression and the public’s right to access important information 
(the case concerned a deadly drug that caused deformed births in much of the 
British population).51 In its review, the Court refused to determine the case 
based solely on which value was more important. Instead, the Court looked at 
the facts of the case: on the one hand, the potentially prejudiced case was 
essentially finished and in a “legal cocoon;”52 on the other hand, the facts of 
the case at issue involved a “disaster”53 and a “matter of undisputed public 
concern.”54 Thus, the Court ruled that, based on proportional standards, the 
 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. at 466, 472. 
 48 See id. at 469–70; HCJ 5016/ 96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 207 [1997] (Isr.) 
(“[T]he stricter the separation between religion and state under a given system, and the more that the rights are 
set out in more ‘absolute’ terms, the more likely that such a system will prefer human rights to human feelings. 
Conversely, the more permeable the boundaries between religion and state, and the more a legal culture is 
predicated on a ‘relative’ conception of human rights, the greater significance it will attach to feelings as a 
proper ground for limiting human rights.”). 
 49 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 470. 
 50 Id. at 466. 
 51 Case of the Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 34 (1979). 
 52 Id. ¶ 31. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 6. 
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British government must allow publication about the facts of the case, not 
solely because freedom of speech was fundamentally more valuable than the 
values of a fair trial, but because factually there was a much greater public 
benefit achieved by allowing the information to be published compared to the 
small detriment of releasing information about a defunct case.55 Through this 
ruling, the Court helped diffuse any political strife in British society between 
free speech values and the values of a fair trial. Instead, the Court 
deconstructed the issue into its basic components and allowed for the dispute 
to be resolved through a factual assessment.56 
4. Legal Black Holes 
Nations that do not use proportionality review tend to authorize 
infringements on rights based on technical discussions of standing and 
separation of powers.57 The United States has denied protections based on 
these technical situations.58 Former HCJ Chief Justice Aharon Baraak 
describes this legal practice as creating “black holes” in the law.59 A court 
practicing proportionality review largely fills in these black holes.60 For 
instance, Justice Barak stated in a more recent case that the HCJ “does not 
 
 55 Id. ¶ 67. 
 56 See Case of the Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No.1), App. No. 6538/74, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) ¶ 65 (1979). 
 57 See generally Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 58 See generally Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). On the 
question of whether certain foreign nationals had a constitutional right to retrial after being denied rights to 
access their foreign consul, the Court held that such rights were not guaranteed because only a presidential 
memorandum demanded such a retrial, and “the President’s Memorandum [does not] constitute directly 
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions.” Because 
of an arguably technical aspect of the separation of powers, the Court was comfortable denying these foreign 
nationals a basic right of customary international law, memorialized by the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. Id. 
 59 AHARON BARAK, A JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 194 (2006). See also Eileen Kaufman, Deference or 
Abdication: A Comparison of the Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States in Cases Involving Real or 
Perceived Threats to National Security, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 95, 96 (2013) (“The Israeli 
Supreme Court summarily rejects the political question doctrine and treats challenges to the legality of military 
conduct as justiciable, whereas the United States Supreme Court typically declines to hear cases involving 
ongoing military actions. Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court rarely utilizes a state secrets privilege, 
whereas the United States Supreme Court embraces the doctrine, which often immunizes illegal governmental 
action.”); John P. Blanc, A Total Eclipse of Human Rights—Illustrated by Mohamed v. Jepesen Dataplan, Inc., 
114 W. VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2012) (“[T]he federal judiciary has allowed human rights to be eclipsed by 
the national security interests pursued by the Executive Branch. . . . In giving excessive deference to the 
Executive Branch’s claims of privilege under the judicially-created ‘state secrets doctrine,’ the federal 
judiciary has undertaken a ‘complete abandonment of judicial control . . . lead[ing] to intolerable abuses.’) 
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953)). 
 60 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 477. 
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refrain from judicial review merely because the military commander[’s] . . . 
actions have political and military ramifications.”61 A great number of HCJ 
decisions have unswervingly followed this approach.62 Cohen-Eliya and Porat 
attribute the HCJ’s tenacity in reviewing even the most controversial issues 
and policies of Israeli national security under the judicial microscope to 
Israel’s culture of proportionality review.63 
Such constitutional culture stands in contrast to judicial attitudes in the 
United States. For instance, in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, a dual U.S.-Yemenese 
citizen was placed on a targeted killing “kill list” allegedly authorized by the 
United States and its Central Intelligence Agency, despite that he had been 
charged with no crime and was only suspected of conspiring with the terrorist 
group Al Quaeda.64 The plaintiffs brought the charge against the U.S. 
Government, but the District Court for the District of Columbia declined to 
hear the case on the grounds that “any judicial determination as to the propriety 
of a military attack on Anwar Al-Aulaqi would “require this court to elucidate 
the . . . standards that are to guide a President when he evaluates the veracity of 
 
 61 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477 1, 23 (2005). 
 62 Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the 
Military: Lessons from Israel, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 921 (2010) (noting a “dramatic decline in the 
deference accorded to the military commander by the Supreme Court.”). 
 63 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 33, at 470. See also Eur. Consult. Ass., Guidelines of the Comm. of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, 804th Meeting 8–9 
(2002) (“All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights and the principle of the rule 
of law, while excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must 
be subject to appropriate supervision. . . . When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions must be defined 
as precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued. . . . Within the context of the 
fight against terrorism, the collection and the processing of personal data by any competent authority in the 
field of State security may interfere with the respect for private life only if such collection and processing, in 
particular: (i) are governed by appropriate provisions of domestic law; (ii) are proportionate to the aim for 
which the collection and the processing were foreseen; (iii) may be subject to supervision by an external 
independent authority. . . . Measures used in the fight against terrorism that interfere with privacy (in particular 
body searches, house searches, bugging, telephone tapping, surveillance of correspondence and use of 
undercover agents) must be provided for by law. It must be possible to challenge the lawfulness of these 
measures before a court. Measures taken to fight terrorism must be planned and controlled by the authorities so 
as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force and, within this framework, the use of 
arms by the security forces must be strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting persons against unlawful 
violence or to the necessity of carrying out a lawful arrest.”); McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R.48 (1995) (“[T]he Court must carefully scrutinise, as noted above, not only 
whether the force used by the soldiers was strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting persons against 
unlawful violence but also whether the anti-terrorist operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so 
as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force.”).  
 64 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4, 6 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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military intelligence,” an undertaking forbidden by the American “political 
question doctrine.”65 
Thus, the benefits offered by proportionality review include expanding the 
array of constitutional rights; increasing sensitivity to minority values by 
reframing issues as factual disputes, thereby avoiding alienating minority 
values; and filling in legal “black holes.”66 
II. HOREV 
The HCJ’s decision in Horev illustrates these benefits of proportionality 
review.67 In Horev, the HCJ examined the constitutionality of a government 
ban on driving through a religious neighborhood on the Sabbath.68 The traffic 
municipality instituted this ban because commuters greatly offended the 
religious feelings of the neighborhood dwellers.69 This ban only added a two-
minute detour to travel time for commuters, besides those living on Bar Ilan 
street.70 Nevertheless, the issue sparked “bitter debate” between religious and 
secular Israelis and aggravated “deep-seated political disputes” about the 
separation of religion and state in Israel.71 The Court held that the ban passed 
Constitutional muster and was proportional because the detriment of the two-
minute detour was minimal when compared to the great harm to religious 
feelings that would result if the ban were lifted.72 
The case presents a clear example of the ways in which proportionality 
review can expand the array of rights that a court will consider, thereby 
diffusing political strife by including and giving voice to minority or fringe 
values. 
 
 65 Id. at 70 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
See also Stephanie Blum, Preventative Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison of How the United 
States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, 4 HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS 3 
(2008) (“[B]oth Israel and Britain have almost always had an explicit role for judicial review before subjecting 
the suspect to prolonged preventive incapacitation whereas President Bush has asserted that the executive 
branch can alone resolve factual disputes and determine whether an individual is an enemy combatant based 
on intelligence reports without any opportunity for the detainee to respond.”). 
 66 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 477. 
 67 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 214 [1997] (Isr.). 
 68 Id. at 165. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 172. 
 71 Id. at 161. 
 72 Id. at 246. 
KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/22/2015 12:26 PM 
600 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
A. Expanded Rights and Diffusing Political Strife 
First, the Court held that a broad array of rights earned protection under 
HCJ scrutiny, even rights not formally enshrined in the Basic Laws (Israel’s 
equivalent of a Bill of Rights).73 According to Chief Justice Barak “whether 
the violation relates to rights ‘covered’ by the two Basic Laws or not is equally 
irrelevant.”74 This statement demonstrates the HCJ’s default approach of 
expanding the array of constitutionally protected rights beyond those explicitly 
mentioned in text.75 The Court takes the position that it must protect all values 
of the State of Israel, a “Jewish and democratic state.”76 This position flows 
from the text of the Basic Laws, which states that its purpose “is to protect 
human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of 
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.”77 The Court reads this 
clause as permission to scrutinize any legislation or order that conflicts with a 
broad set of values. As mentioned, by expanding the set of protected values, 
the Court invites proportionality review, as “[t]he broader the conception of 
rights becomes, the greater the likelihood that these rights will at some point 
conflict with other rights or interests; therefore there will be a need to balance 
the rights and interests involved in order to arrive at the most reasonable 
solution.”78 
In the Court’s view, the Sabbath traffic did not restrict the worshippers’ 
freedom of religion but rather their religious feelings.79 The Basic Laws did not 
specifically protect religious feelings.80 Nevertheless, the Court analyzed 
 
 73 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 200 [1997] (Isr.). 
 74 Id. See also Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights? 7 (Jean Monet 
Program, Working Paper No. 09/08, 2008) (“It should be noted that in the crudest balancer’s view, there 
cannot be any concept of fundamental rights having priority over other considerations.”). 
 75 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 200 [1997] (Isr.) (“[I]t has always been our 
position that legislation includes both general and specific purposes. The general purposes are the values of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; the specific purposes refer to the specific proper purpose 
specified by the limitation clause). 
 76 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 5752–1992, 1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 
463, 481 (2011).  
 79 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 218 [1997] (Isr.) (“[L]et it be 
emphasized that I am not convinced that Sabbath traffic on Bar-Ilan Street infringes the freedom of religion of 
the residents. These residents are free to observe the religious commandments. Sabbath traffic does not serve 
to deny them this freedom.”). 
 80 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 5752–1992, 1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
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whether religious feelings deserved protection as a Jewish and democratic 
right. To preserve the peace and quiet of their day of rest, the respondents had 
requested that traffic be blocked off completely from their street.81 The Court 
analyzed their request by looking at the Sabbath in the context of Jewish 
religion and history: 
Deprive Judaism of the Sabbath, and you have deprived it of its soul, 
for the Sabbath comprises the very essence of Judaism’s nature. Over 
the generations, throughout its blood-soaked history, our nation has 
sacrificed many [lives] in the name of the Sabbath.82 
The Chief Judge is not a religious person,83 yet, he entered into the mindset of 
religious people to understand and respect the protection that they requested. 
He described the subjective experience of a religious Sabbath, placed the 
Sabbath in the context of a national history and ethos, and even looked at the 
issue through an ancient religious text,84 all to look through the lens of the 
respondent and to respect their position. This move illustrates the Court’s 
willingness to consider all rights and not to allow a majority view to 
automatically trump minority values. 
Next, the Court analyzed whether religious feelings deserved protection as 
a democratic right. The Court reasoned that since it would restrict certain 
fundamental rights to prevent physical harm—for instance, limiting the right to 
protest85—then it would also protect religious feelings: 
A democratic society, which is prepared to restrict rights in order to 
prevent physical injury, must be equally sensitive to the potential 
need for restricting rights in order to prevent emotional harm, which, 
at times, may be even more severe than physical injury. A democratic 
 
 81 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 165 [1997] (Isr.). 
 82 Id. at 201.  
 83 See Ilan Marciano, MK Ravitz: Barak made secularism a religion, YNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3303877,00.html. 
 84 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 201 [1997] (Isr.). Later in the 
opinion, the Court stated: “Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, described this special atmosphere as the additional 
soul which man is granted upon the entrance of the Sabbath, which leaves him as it exits. Babylonian Talmud, 
Tractate Beitza 16a, [110]. This rest is intended to bring the routine of daily life to a halt, and relieve man of 
daily worries. . . . A crowded street that traverses the heart of the neighborhood, with the sounds of honking 
and engines, stands in stark contrast to the Sabbath atmosphere, as the majority of the local residents 
understand it.” Id. at 224. This analysis through the lens of a religious Judaism shows the Court’s sensitivity to 
a broad range of values, even those not held by the Justices themselves. 
 85 HCJ 153/83 Alan Alevi and Yaheli Amit v. Southern Dist. Police Commander 38(2) PD 1, 1–2 [1984] 
(Isr.).  
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society seeking to protect life, physical integrity and property, must 
also strive to protect feelings.86 
The Court also noted that protecting this right was in the “public interest in 
preserving the public peace and public order.”87 
Thus, the Court determined that the religious feelings of the respondents 
deserved protection as a Jewish and democratic rights, despite the fact that 
such feelings were not specifically enshrined in the Basic Laws.88 Such 
analysis helped to “[lower] the stakes of politics” and avoided favoring certain 
rights over others in a categorical fashion.89 The Court recognized a need to 
protect a right, even if that right was not important to a clear majority of the 
population, or a fundamental right protected by the Basic laws, and thereby 
prevented a majority rule from swallowing up minority rights.90 
B. Systematic Approach and Pre-Balance Weighing of the Rights 
Having determined that religious feelings deserved protection, the Court 
turned next to balancing those feelings against the petitioner’s freedom of 
movement.91 The Court’s approach to this balancing act demonstrates a 
consistent and systematic method and models what proportionality review can 
achieve. Most notably, the Court engages in a systematic comparison of the 
conflicting rights before attempting to balance them against one another.92 This 
difference in analytical approach before balancing stands in contrast to the 
approach in Beit Sourik and similar cases, where virtually no discussion of the 
relative value of rights occurred before the balancing process.93 
 
 86 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 203 [1997] (Isr.). 
 87 Id. at 220.  
 88 See id. at 206, 207; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a 
constitutionally protected right to privacy despite its absence from the Bill of Rights). 
 89 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 466 (alteration in original). 
 90 But see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 203–04 [1997] (Isr.) (“Democracy is 
not merely formal democracy—the ‘rule book conception,’ according to which decisions are left to majority 
will. Rather, democracy is substantive—the ‘rights conception,’ according to which the majority is precluded 
from infringing on human rights.”).  
 91 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 209 [1997] (Isr.). 
 92 Id. at 209–12. 
 93 See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov. Isr. 58(5) PD 1, 24 [2004] (Isr.). Paragraphs 51 
through 81 layout a detailed proportionality analysis weighing the security benefits of different sections of 
Israel’s security fence against the detriment to human rights in each of those sections. Id. at 31–43. Neither in 
these paragraphs nor anywhere else in the opinion where in the opinion does the Court engage in a pre-balance 
evaluation of the relative importance of those rights.  
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In this case, the Court recognized the need to assess the relative importance 
of the rights before balancing them so that the weighing process could be 
rational.94 The Court’s decision to proceed in this manner bears explanation. 
The Court assessed the relative social importance of the different values 
before weighing them because different principles and freedoms carry different 
weight in society. Because the Court was “balancing between conflicting 
interests and values”95 and “placing competing values on the scale”96 and 
weighing them, it had to assess the relative weight of the rights in question 
before balancing them. As the Court stated, “balance on the basis of weight 
necessarily implies a social assessment of the relative importance of the 
different principles” before the balancing process.97 
For instance, if the value of protecting religious feelings was not so 
important in the first place, then a significant amount of hurt feelings would 
not necessarily justify a moderate restriction on the right to free movement. 
Conversely, if religious feelings were important, then perhaps protecting a 
moderate degree of hurt feelings would justify a moderate restriction on 
freedom of movement. Interestingly, this procedure retreats somewhat from the 
benefit mentioned earlier, that of avoiding political strife by avoiding ranking 
certain rights over others.98 On the other hand, it appears to be a necessary 
move for courts employing proportionality review, in order to ensure that the 
process is rational and represents a fair trade-off between benefits and 
detriments.99 
The Court would not only have to assess the importance of rights before a 
proportionality review; the Court would also have to assess these rights relative 
to one another.100 As the Court cited from an earlier case: “[a] social value, 
 
 94 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 197–98 [1997] (Isr.) (“[T]he process of 
placing competing values on the balancing scales . . . does not establish criterion or value weights to assist in 
performing the interpretative task.”) (citing FH 9/77 Israel Electric Co. v. “Ha’aretz” Newspaper Publications 
32(3) PD 337, 361 (Isr.)).  
 95 Id. at 193.  
 96 Id. “This was the Court’s approach regarding the conflict between freedom of expression and 
preserving public peace” Id.  
 97 Id. at 198 (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board 41(1) PD 421, 434 (Isr.)).  
 98 See Part I.A.iii. 
 99 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive Meanings of Proportionality in the Supreme 
Court’s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38 ISR. L. REV. 262, 267 (2005) (“[Proportionality] analysis is 
in fact based on a calculation of [] the relative importance of the conflicting values and the impact of the 
infringement on each of these values.”).  
 100 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation 51(4) PD 153, 192 [1997] (Isr.). 
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such as freedom of expression, does not have ‘absolute weight’.”101 The weight 
of any social principle is relative. The status of any fundamental principle is 
always assessed in relation to that of other principles with which it is likely to 
conflict.102 Thus, the Court determined that a generalized standard for 
balancing between religious feelings and freedom of movement would have to 
be found.103 The Court would have to determine how to value religious 
feelings as compared to the freedom of movement before beginning to balance 
them against each other. This would provide the Court with three fundamental 
benefits. 
First, assessing the relative weights of these rights would provide guidance 
when facing a similar case in the future.104 Second, this assessment would 
allow the Court to formulate a “rational principle” that would guide its 
balancing process.105 Deciding a certain trade-off between competing rights 
and values gains more credibility when judges are realistic and open about the 
relative importance of those values. Thus, for instance, speed limits aim at 
protecting life, but they restrict the freedom of speeding on the highway. Any 
proportionality review that would weigh the benefits of speed limits against the 
detriment of restricting “speeding rights” would have to assess the relative 
weight of life and speeding. As many scholars have noted, courts employing 
proportionality review determine whether a rights-limiting action promotes a 
given, axiomatic system of constitutional principles; therefore, these courts 
must first determine the relative weights of the values in question to determine 
where they fall within that system, to determine the best way to promote the 
overall constitutional scheme of rights.106 Third, through this pre-balancing 
assessment of the relative value of rights, the Court would proceed according 
to a “substantive criteria, which is neither paternalistic nor accidental.”107 By 
assessing, in a standardized and procedural way, the relative importance of 
goals and rights before balancing, the Court assured that its decision would not 
merely reflect personal conviction or taste but a fair and objective balance 
 
 101 Id. at 194 (citing CA 105/92 Reem Engineers and Contractors Ltd. V. Municipality of Upper Nazareth 
47(5) IsrSC 189, 205 (Isr.)). 
 102 ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 50–56 (Julian Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2002). See also The Margin of Appreciation, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.coe.int/t/ 
dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/paper2_en.asp (“The final decision on how much latitude is to 
be given to national authorities depends on the weight the Court attaches to . . . the nature of the right[s]”). 
 103 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.). 
 104 Id. at 196. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 470. 
 107 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 196 [1997] (Isr.). 
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between competing claims, rooted in precedent determining the relative 
importance of rights. 
The following discussion of the Horev case will highlight how the Court 
balanced the relative importance of the rights and goals at issue in a systematic 
way based on reasoning and precedent. 
C. Threshold of Tolerance 
Before beginning to balance the different rights, the Court sought a limiting 
principle to determine how much protection of religious feelings could limit 
freedom of movement. When other more fundamental rights infringe on 
protected feelings, the Court would not restrict those rights so that they 
“eventually disappear.”108 Rather, the Court would only restrict more 
fundamental rights for the sake of feelings when those feelings were hurt 
beyond a “threshold of tolerance.”109 The Court cited older cases where it 
balanced the protection of feelings against the freedom of speech to lay down 
this “threshold of tolerance” test.110 This threshold represents the risk of hurt 
feelings that democratic citizens accept in exchange for living in a free 
culture.111 
In other older cases, the Court dealt with “a horizontal clash between two 
conflicting human rights” of equal value112 and therefore did not engage in a 
preliminary determination of whether the rights could be balanced against each 
other in the first place.113 But here, freedom of movement outweighed 
 
 108 Id. at 204 (“If we were to restrict freedom of expression each time that feelings were hurt, freedom of 
expression would eventually disappear.”) (citing HCJ 953/89 Indoor v. Mayor of Jerusalem 45(4) PD 683, 690 
(Isr.)).  
 109 Id. at 206.  
 110 Id. at 204, 205. See also HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Films and Plays Censorship Bd., 
43(2) PD 1, 21 [1989] (Isr.) (“It reflects, in my opinion, the conception that a democratic society, by its very 
nature and content, is based on tolerance of others’ opinions. In a pluralistic society tolerance is the one power 
allowing for shared existence. Thus, every member of the public takes upon himself the ‘risk’ of suffering 
some offence to his feelings in the course of free exchange of opinions.”).  
 111 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 205 [1997] (Isr.). 
 112 Id. at 220.  
 113 HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Isr. 59(4) PD 27–28 [2005] (Isr.) (“In the case before 
us, we are presented with a conflict between two basic rights of equal weight . . . both the freedom of worship 
and the freedom of movement have been recognized in our case law as being on the highest level of the scale 
of rights. . . . In addition, with regard to both of them an identical balancing formula has been applied in order 
to balance them against the same public interests. . . . The result implied by the conclusion that we are 
concerned with a conflict between two rights of equal weight is that the balance required in this case is a 
horizontal balance, which will allow the coexistence of both of these rights.”). 
KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/22/2015 12:26 PM 
606 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
protection of feelings in general.114 The Court therefore would have to 
determine whether the offense to feelings was severe enough even get on the 
scale against another heavily weighted right.115 
In this move, the Court showed that before it balances rights, it focuses on 
the specific nature of those rights. The Court classified and ranked values to set 
up the most rational balancing process. Not all rights would deserve equal 
protection; rather, they would require more or less weight, depending on their 
nature.116 According to the Court, the nature of protected feelings is that, in 
general, their value does not even compare to more fundamental rights unless 
there is breach of the “threshold of tolerance” described above.117 Only then 
can there even be a discussion of a proportionality review between them.118 
Thus, the greater weight of freedom of movement and the lesser weight of 
protected feelings significantly influenced the Court’s proportionality review. 
The Court did not determine the relative weight of these rights arbitrarily. 
The Court derived the “threshold of tolerance” analysis from earlier cases 
dealing with balancing feelings against free speech.119 Because free speech and 
free movement held equal weight as fundamental rights, and because 
protection of feelings required a threshold of tolerance to limit free speech in a 
previous case, therefore in the present case, protection of feelings required a 
threshold of tolerance to limit freedom of movement.120 The Court displayed 
here a principled, almost quantitative method of analysis based on precedent. 
All questions of balancing hurt feelings against the heaviest fundamental rights 
would garner similar treatment under a consistently applied “threshold of 
tolerance” analysis. 
The Court further fleshed out this “threshold of tolerance” test and gave it 
more nuance, holding that only “severe, serious, and grave offenses” to 
feelings could justify a limitation on certain fundamental rights.121 By further 
limiting the situations where hurt feelings could limit the freedom of 
 
 114 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 192–93 [1997] (Isr.). 
 115 Id. at 193 (“[A] decision’s reasonableness is assessed by balancing between competing values, 
according to their respective weight” but “there are some interests against which there can be no balancing”). 
 116 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 208 [1997] (Isr.). 
 117 Id. at 204, 206–07. 
 118 Id. at 206. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 208–09. 
 121 Id. at 209. 
KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/22/2015 12:26 PM 
2015] ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 607 
movement, the Court further emphasized the great importance of freedom of 
movement relative to religious feelings. 
Again, the Court approached the discussion of the relative importance of 
the rights in systematic fashion. The Court explained that the “threshold of 
tolerance” analysis does not apply equally in all situations, but rather is “a 
function of the right and infringement in question.”122 Justice Zamir stated in 
Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel: 
The threshold of tolerance for feelings, is neither set nor identical in 
every situation. The threshold depends, inter alia, on the identity of 
the conflicting right. For instance, the threshold may vary depending 
on whether the right in question is a basic right, such as freedom of 
expression, or a material, financial interest. Thus, while the threshold 
can be quite high if protecting feelings requires infringing the free-
dom of expression, it may be lower regarding infringements on prop-
erty.123 
Thus, the threshold of tolerance for hurt feelings changes depending not only 
on whether it is being balanced against a fundamental right, but also on the 
level of importance of the fundamental right that has been limited to protect 
such feelings.124 
In Horev, the limited right was the right to freedom of movement. The 
Court cited earlier cases demonstrating the importance of freedom of 
movement as “a natural right, recognized as self-evident in every country 
boasting a democratic regime,”125 that was “of equal value and weight” with 
freedom of expression,126 both of which “may be called ‘superior’”127 and are 
granted a “consecrated place of honor in the temple of basic human rights.”128 
Because freedom of movement is “a freedom at the pinnacle of human rights in 
Israel”129 and is such a basic, fundamental right compared to protection of 
religious feelings, “only severe, serious, and grave offense to another’s feelings 
can justify the infringement of a basic human right,” such as freedom of 
 
 122 Id. at 206. 
 123 Id. at 206–07 (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509, 521 [1997] 
(Isr.)). 
 124 Implicitly, to the HCJ, not all fundamental rights are of equal importance. 
 125 HCJ 111/53 Kaufman v. Minister of the Interior PD 534, 536 [1953] (Isr.). 
 126 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 209 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. 
Minster of the Interior 40(2) PD 701, 708 [1986] (Isr.)). 
 127 Id. (citing 153/83 Levy v. S.D. Police Commander 38(2) PD 393, 398 [1984] (Isr.)). 
 128 Id. at 209–10. 
 129 Id. at 213. 
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movement.130 Thus, by adding further nuance to the threshold of tolerance test, 
the Court emphasized the great importance of freedom of movement relative to 
protected feelings. Moreover, the Court used precedent to determine the 
relative value of the rights, for instance, by comparing freedom of movement 
with freedom of expression. 
D. Scope, Depth, and Probability 
The Court added even further nuances, including scope, depth, and 
probability requirements, which further emphasized the relative importance of 
freedom of movement to protected feelings. To deserve protection when very 
high order fundamental rights are at issue, the affront to feelings must not only 
be “severe, serious, and grave,” but it must reach an appropriate “scope and 
depth.”131 The offense must hurt a sufficiently broad swath of the population, 
not just extreme minority groups, and it must constitute a deep offense 
immediately, not just minor irritations that spread out over many years become 
severely offensive.132 Moreover, the occurrence of the offense must be 
sufficiently probable in a given situation.133 The Court recounted different 
probability standards for harms that would gain protection at the expense of 
other more important rights, based on the “magnitude of the various conflicting 
rights.”134 Justice Barak noted in an earlier case: 
[W]hen adopting the standard of probability one should not follow a 
general, universal criterion, since it depends on the force of the dif-
ferent values that come into conflict within a given legal context. . . . 
The question always is whether the measure of harm, weighed 
against the possibility that it may not actually occur, justifies viola-
tion of a civil right so as to prevent the danger.135 
Thus, by piling on standards and hurdles limiting the ability of protected 
feelings to infringe on freedom of movement, the Court emphasized the great 
importance of freedom of movement relative to protected feelings. 
 
 130 Id. at 209. 
 131 Id. at 210 (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509, 524–25 [1997] 
(Isr.)) (“The severity of the offensiveness is measured on two levels: its scope and its depth. First, the harm 
must be broad. It is therefore insufficient that one person or a small group with minority extreme opinions is 
offended.”). 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Id. at 211 (citing EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 225 [1985] (Isr.)); 
CrimA 126/62 Dissenchick v. Attorney Gen. 17 PD 169, 311 [1953] (Isr.); id. at 211–12 [1997] (Isr.) (citing 
448/85 Dahar v. Minster of the Interior 40(2) PD 701, 708 [1986] (Isr.)). 
 135 EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 98 [1985] (Isr.). 
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Again, the determination of the relative importance of the conflicting 
values occurred systematically and according to Court precedent. The Court 
noted that when balancing hurt feelings against freedom of expression136 and 
freedom of worship and freedom of conscience,137 the Court required a “near 
certainty” or “proximately certain” probability of harm.”138 Likewise, because 
freedom of movement ranked equally with these other fundamental freedoms, 
they could only be limited by a “nearly certain” or “proximately certain” 
offense to religious feelings.139 Thus, legal precedent determined the relative 
value of rights and the way unequal rights should enter the balancing equation. 
In this case, there was not even a question of probability in determining 
offense to religious feelings, as “absolute certainty” as to offense of religious 
feelings “was unequivocally proven.”140 
E. Summary 
To summarize, the Court in Horev used multiple layers of tests and 
precedent before it began a proportionality review that balanced offended 
feelings against freedom of movement. These tests included a “threshold of 
tolerance,” a magnitude requirement, and a “scope, depth and probability” 
requirement. First, the court required that the offense to religious feelings 
passed a “threshold of tolerance” before it would limit any other right: the 
Court would only limit free movement rights for the sake of feelings if feelings 
were hurt beyond the normal risk a citizen takes by living in a free culture of 
conflicting ideas.141 Next, this breach against feelings had to be “severe, 
serious, and grave” in order to limit more fundamental rights such as freedom 
of movement and speech.142 Such fundamental rights were weighted equally 
based on precedent, and they only get on the scale against “severe, serious, and 
grave” offenses to feelings, again based on precedent. Finally, offenses to 
 
 136 HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior 7(2) PD 24 [1953] 871; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minis-
ter of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 211 [1997] (Isr.)(citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film & Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 
[1987](Isr.)); HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Films & Plays Bd. 43(2) PD 26–27 [1989] (Isr.); HCJ 
680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) PD 25 [1988] (Isr.). 
 137 Id. (citing HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Gov’t of Isr. 51(2) PD 509 [1997] (Isr.)); id. (citing 
HCJ 2725/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem Dist. Commander of Police 49(5) PD 366 [1995] (Isr.)). 
 138 HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor 42(4) PD 25 [1988] (Isr.); EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chair-
man of the Elections Comm. 39(2) PD 99 [1985] (Isr.); HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 
153, 211 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of the Interior 40(2) PD [1986](Isr.)).  
 139 Id.  
 140 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 227 [1997] (Isr.). 
 141 Id. at 209. 
 142 Id. at 210. 
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feelings could only limit these high order fundamental rights if they have 
enough “scope,” “depth,” and are “nearly certain” or “proximately certain” to 
occur. The offense to feelings must pass through four hurdles before the Court 
balances it against the highest fundamental rights.143 
These multiple layers of “pre-proportionality tests” are all designed to 
ensure that the Court determines the relative importance of the conflicting 
rights and values before balancing them against each other. Again, this 
determination is necessary, as a balance between rights must account for the 
relative difference between types of rights, as well as aim at promoting an 
overall scheme of Constitutional rights with certain rights ranked higher than 
others.144 As the Horev case shows, the Court has the capacity to perform this 
pre-balancing analysis of rights in a reasoned fashion based on court precedent. 
F. The Holding 
The Court determined that the infringement on the respondents’ religious 
feelings were “severe, grave, and serious”145 and sufficiently probable.146 Thus 
the first sub-test was satisfied, that of a rational connection. Next, the Court 
analyzed whether the government employed the least restrictive means 
available.147 The Court determined that the only way to limit freedom of 
movement in least restrictive manner while preserving religious feelings was to 
close Bar-Ilan street exclusively during prayer times, since the harm to 
religious feelings caused by noisy street traffic is inflicted mainly during 
prayer times.148 To close the street for any more time would overly burden the 
freedom of movement and would not pass the least restrictive means test.149 
Finally, because this limited closure only caused a two-minute detour to 
 
 143 Id. at 208–12. 
 144 See, e.g., Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267 n.18 (comparing the proportionality test with a German 
case: “An example of the way in which the values regime is implemented in Germany, is provided by the 
Mephisto case. In this case the court discussed the constitutional validity of a prohibition on the publication of 
a book. The book was based on the authentic image of a deceased theatrical actor. Who had in the past 
collaborated with the Nazi regime. The court examined the linkage between the conflicting values of freedom 
of speech on the one hand and of the actor’s reputation on the other and ruled that a person’s reputation is 
closer to the core of human dignity so that this right supersedes freedom of speech”). 
 145 HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 224–25 [1997] (Isr.). 
 146 Id. at 226–27. In this case, there was not even a question of probability in determining offense to 
religious feelings: “Beyond ‘near certainty,’ absolute certainty was unequivocally proven. It was proven that 
the religious feelings and lifestyle of the local Ultra-Orthodox residents are in fact severely, gravely, and 
seriously offended by reason of traffic going through their neighborhood on Sabbaths and festivals.” Id.  
 147 Id. at 227–28.  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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motorists, the restriction against the freedom of movement survived the third 
narrow proportionality test.150 The Court saw no need to judicially expand the 
right to freedom of movement against the right to religious feelings because 
the offense to freedom of movement was not excessive.151 Horev show that the 
Court will not activate the third proportionality test and re-hash the balance 
against rights when the damaged right has suffered only minimal damage. 
The Court noted that the government was required to leave Bar Ilan street 
open to emergency security vehicles because Bar-Ilan was a main “traffic 
artery” to a major hospital.152 Even those two extra minutes of traffic time are 
“crucial when it comes to saving human lives.”153 This last sentence deserves 
special attention, because in later cases, the Court showed that it is willing to 
sacrifice security akin to two “crucial” minutes of time necessary to save 
human lives. 
The following discussion of the Horev decision demonstrated some of the 
main benefits of proportionality review. It showed how proportionality review 
diffuses political strife by expanding the array of rights that a court will 
protect. It also showed how proportionality review diffuses political strife by 
transforming bitter debates about the supremacy of values into a rational 
assessment of a trade-off between benefits and detriments. Finally, it 
demonstrates the Court engaging in a pre-balancing evaluation of rights and 
showed how that process ensures the rationality of proportionality review. 
III.  THE HCJ, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The HCJ confronted more highly charged topics when discussing the 
human rights of Palestinians limited by Israeli security measures.154 Beginning 
 
 150 Id. at 228. 
 151 Id. at 228–29. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel PD [2004]. The 
HCJ’s treatment of security/rights tradeoffs in the Israel/Palestinian conflict has stirred up extremely different 
responses; see generally Robert Nicholson, Legal Intifada: Palestinian NGOs and Resistance Litigation in 
Israeli Courts, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 381 (2012) (arguing that litigation brought by Palestinian 
NGOs “is not just a struggle for human rights, but is in fact a campaign to use the courts to bring about regime 
change inside the country . . . these Palestinian NGOs work to abolish the Jewish state in favor of a binational 
“state of all its citizens.”). In contrast, “The decisions of Israel’s High Court of Justice illustrate how the 
introduction of rights analysis into the context of occupation abstracts and extrapolates from this context, 
placing both occupiers and occupied on a purportedly equal plane. This move upsets the built-in balance of 
international humanitarian law (IHL), which ensures special protection to people living under occupation, and 
widens the justification for limiting their rights beyond the scope of a strict interpretation of IHL.” Aeyal M. 
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as early as 1982 and continuing until today, the HCJ has heard a growing 
caseload brought by NGOs claiming that military security action taken by the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and other actions by Israel’s government have 
violated Palestinian human rights,155 including home demolitions,156 forced 
movement,157 restriction on the freedom of movement,158 access to land,159 
torture and inhumane prison conditions,160 and targeted killings.161 In these 
cases, the ease of bringing a case (justicability)162 despite the political and 
military implications of the holdings,163 the ease of standing, and the sheer 
volume of cases heard by the HCJ demand attention. In a fairly recent case, the 
HCJ listed such judgments dealing with military and national security issues in 
the “thousands.”164 
According to the majority opinion in the Beit Sourik case, “the principle of 
proportionality as a standard restricting the power of the military commander is 
a common thread running through [HCJ] case law.”165 However, the HCJ has 
not always employed consistent methods of evaluating rights before the 
balancing process. In some cases, the Court will evaluate the importance of 
 
Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of 
Occupation? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); see also Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The 
Israeli Legal System’s Failure to Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35 
(2001); Michael Sfard, The Price of Internal Legal Opposition to Human Rights Abuses, 1 J. HUM. RIGHTS 
PRAC. 1, 37, 39 (2009) (“[T]he Israeli Court’s jurisprudence has systematically enhanced the power and 
authority of the Israeli Army and approved a wide range of abuses of the rights of the occupied population.”). 
 155 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense [2007] (Isr.). 
 156 See, e.g., HCJ 358/88 Ass’n for Civ. Rights v. C.D. Commander 43(2) PD 529 [1989] (Isr.). 
 157 HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank 56(6) PD 352 [2002] (Isr.). 
 158 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD [2007] (Isr.). 
 159 HCJ 9593/04 Rashed Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria, 2 PD 56 [2004] (Isr.). 
 160 Text of Supreme Court Decision on GSS Practices, JewishVirtualLibrary.org (Sept. 6, 1999), 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120419T094118-GSS%20practices%20-%20Judgment%20-%206-9-
1999%20-%20Supreme%20Court%20Israel.pdf. 
 161 HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Gov. of Isr. 459 PD [2002] (Isr.). 
 162 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 477 (2005) (stating that when the 
decisions or acts of the military commander impinge upon human rights, they are “justiceable.”). 
 163 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Isr. 459 PD 511 [1994] (Isr.). 
 164 Id. at 511 (“Thousands of judgments have been given by the Supreme Court, which, in the absence of 
any other adjudicative instance, has addressed these issues.”) Of further note, as the HCJ heard these cases, 
their deference toward the government and military decreased steadily; see Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, 
Prolonged Armed Conflict and Deference to the Military: Lessons from Israel, supra note 151 (finding that a 
“gradual but dramatic decline in the deference accorded to the military commander by the [Israeli] Supreme 
Court” based on the “continuation of the armed conflict and its aftermath, namely, the routinization and 
increase in the number of petitions by the civilian population.”). 
 165 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Isr. [2004] (“Indeed, the principle of propor-
tionality as a standard restricting the power of the military commander is a common thread running through 
our case law.”). 
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rights before balancing them against one another.166 In other cases, the Court 
does not enter this discussion.167 
A. Basis in International Law 
In general, the HCJ has applied the proportionality standard to questions of 
balancing security interests and human rights relating to Israel’s occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza by drawing on international law sources.168 
Particularly, the Court has relied on the Fourth Hague Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907).169 The Court derived this 
proportionality test from Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land of 1907, which obliges the occupying State to 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety;170 and Article 27 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that “Protected persons are entitled, 
in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family 
rights, their religious convictions and practices,” but that “the Parties to the 
conflict [where one State occupies another] may take such measures of control 
and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of 
the war.”171 The HCJ has interpreted Article 27, which allows occupying 
military forces to limit rights for the sake of security “as may be necessary,” to 
allow a proportionality analysis of such military actions to ensure that they are 
 
 166 See HCJ 1890/03 Municipality of Bethlehem v. State of Israel 1–2 PD [2005]. 
 167 See HCJ 10356/02 Hess v. IDF Commander in West Bank 53 PD 60 [2004]. 
 168 HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Defence (2) IsrLR 352, 370–75 [2006] (citing Judith Gardam, 
Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993)); Judith Gardam, Legal Re-
straints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 285 (1996); Olivera Medenica, 
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329 (2001); Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror, 32 ISR. Y.B. HUM. 
RTS. 1999 (2002), J. S. Pictet, Developments and Principles of International Humanitarian Law 62 (1985). 
William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 94 
(1982) (“[T]here is a requirement for a subordinate rule to perform the balancing function between military 
and humanitarian requirements. This rule is the rule of proportionality.”). HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human 
Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(5) PD 385, 391 (“Israel is not an isolated island. It is a 
member of an international system’. . . . The combat activities of the IDF are not conducted in a legal void. 
There are legal norms—some from customary international law, some from international law entrenched in 
conventions to which Israel is party, and some in the fundamental principles of Israeli law—which determine 
rules about how combat activities should be conducted.”). 
 169 HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 467 [2006] 
(citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 
1949). 
 170 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense 22 [2007] (Isr.) (citing Convention (IV) respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907). 
 171 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 169.  
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“necessary.”172 The strict reading of the text allows the occupying power to 
take measures “necessary” to promote security and control; however, the HCJ 
has interpreted Article 27 to allow limitations of rights of protected persons as 
“necessary” measure for control and security to protect not only protected 
persons, but also to protect Israelis, even those living illegally in the West 
Bank.173 
B. Deference to the Military 
To “ensure, as far as possible,” the human rights of Palestinians, the Court 
employs the three-prong proportionality test described above: finding a rational 
connection between the security measure and its goal, ensuring that the 
military commander employed the least restrictive means to achieve that goal, 
and reducing that measure’s scope if the restricted right can be greatly 
improved while only minimally decreasing the military’s goal. The military 
has the burden to prove these tests have been satisfied.174 However, the 
proportionality of the measure is examined in relation to the purpose that the 
military commander is trying to achieve;175 and “when the decision of the 
military commander relies upon military knowledge, the Court grants special 
weight to the military expertise of the commander of the area.”176 Deference to 
 
 172 HCJ 769/02 The Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (2) IsrLR 467, 484 
[2006]. 
 173 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, 14 [2005] (Isr.). (“The authority 
to construct a security fence for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of Israeli settlers is derived from 
the need to preserve public order and safety (regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations). It is called for, in light 
of the human dignity of every human individual. It is intended to preserve the life of every person created in 
God’s image. The life of a person who is in the area illegally is not up for the taking. Even if a person is locat-
ed in the area illegally, he is not outlawed.”). See also HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 
22–23 [2007] (Isr.) (“The duty of safeguarding “public order and safety” by virtue of art. 43 of the Hague 
Regulations is broad. It does not apply only to those individuals who are considered “protected persons”, but 
rather, to the entire population within the bounds of the Area at any given time, including residents of the Is-
raeli settlements and Israeli civilians who do not reside within a territory under belligerent occupation (citing 
HCJ 10356/02 Hess v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] PD 58 (3) 443, 455). 
 174 HCJ 9593/04 Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (2) IsrLR 56, 72 [2006] (Isr.).  
 175 See id.  
 176 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, 23 (2005) (Isr.); see also HCJ 
2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 14 [2004] (“The military commander is the 
expert regarding the military quality of the separation fence route. We are experts regarding its humanitarian 
aspects. The military commander determines where, on hill and plain, the separation fence will be erected. 
That is his expertise. We examine whether this route’s harm to the local residents is proportionate. That is our 
expertise”); “The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, reviews the legality of the military 
commander’s discretion. Our point of departure is that the military commander, and those who obey his orders, 
are civil servants holding public positions. In exercising judicial review, we do not turn ourselves into experts 
in security affairs. We do not substitute the security considerations of the military commander with our own 
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the military flows partly from the Court’s acute awareness of the actual 
security situation involved in the decisions. As Justice Barak stated in the Beit 
Sourik case: 
We are members of Israeli society. Although we are sometimes in an 
ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which is not in-
frequently hit by ruthless terror. We are aware of the killing and de-
struction wrought by the terror against the state and its citizens. As 
any other Israelis, we too recognize the need to defend the country 
and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror.177 
While the Court affords deference to the military’s expertise and knowledge, 
this deference usually only affects the first proportionality test of finding a 
rational connection.178 The Court defers to the military that it has the 
knowledge and experience to know when a certain measure is rationally 
required to achieve a certain goal. 
Despite this deference in the first stage of analysis, the Court sometimes 
does not give any added deference to the military for the second or third tests, 
as the cases below illustrate.179 This decision speaks partly to the Court’s 
desire to ensure that the rule of law and individual liberty take equal priority 
with security concerns.180 However, by not even considering added deference 
 
security considerations. We take no position regarding the way security affairs are run. Our task is to guard the 
borders and to maintain the boundaries of the military commander’s discretion . . . It is true, that the security of 
the state is not a “magic word” which makes judicial review disappear. Thus, we shall not be deterred from 
reviewing the decisions of the military commander . . . simply because of the important security considerations 
anchoring his decision. However, we shall not substitute the discretion of the commander with our own discre-
tion. We shall check the legality of the discretion of the military commander and ensure that his decisions fall 
within the ‘zone of reasonableness.”). Id. at 27. 
 177 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel PD 44 [2004] (Isr.). 
 178 See HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 30 [2007] (Isr.) (“This Court does not serve 
as a ‘supreme military commander’, and does not substitute its own discretion for that of the military com-
mander; it merely examines the legality of his actions. The responsibility and the authority were conferred 
upon the military commander, and the court does not set itself up as an expert on matters of security in his 
stead”); see also HCJ 1890/03 Municipality of Bethlehem v. State of Israel, supra note 169, at 40) (“There are 
often several ways of realizing the purpose, all of them proportionate and reasonable. The military commander 
is given the authority to choose between these methods, and as long as the military commander does not depart 
from the ‘margin of proportionality’ and the ‘margin of reasonableness’, the Court will not intervene in his 
discretion.”). 
 179 See, e.g., HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 73 [2004] (Isr.). (declining 
to evaluate the relative importance of archeological property or the value of human life and security); HCJ 
2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel supra note 1 (the Court did not evaluate the 
importance of freedom of movement, access to property, and communal development versus the value of hu-
man life and security). 
 180 For instance, in HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Minister of Defence 36–37 [1999] 
(Isr.) the Court stated: “A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a de-
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to military goals, the Court declines to investigate—in a general and objective 
fashion—the relative importance of security and other liberties.181 The Court 
thereby compromises the rationality of its decision making,182 as the discussion 
below will illustrate. 
1. Haas 
In Haas, the HCJ upheld the military commander’s decision to take and 
demolish certain abandoned buildings of cultural and archeological value 
owned by West Bank Palestinians in order to clear a security road for 
worshippers walking to the Ma’arat HaMachpeleh (Cave of the Patriarchs).183 
According to the opinion, large numbers of pedestrians visited this cave on the 
Jewish Sabbaths and festivals, while murderous attacks on these worshippers 
and security personnel had been committed in recent years by terrorist 
groups.184 At the time, further terrorist attacks constituted a likely and deadly 
threat.185 The commander sought to increase security by widening the road to 
allow security and rescue vehicles to pass alongside the worshippers.186 The 
commander’s request came on the heels of a recent terrorist attack on security 
forces and worshippers travelling the narrow path, which resulted in the death 
of twelve security personnel.187 
 
mocracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components 
in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to 
overcome its difficulties.” 
 181 Cf. HCJ. 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. PD 59 [1997] (Isr.) (evaluating the relative importance 
of religious feelings and freedom of movement). 
 182 HCJ 5016/96 HCJ. 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. PD 206 [1997] (Isr.) (holding that the rational-
ity of a proportionality decision requires a pre-balance weighing of the relative value of rights). 
 183 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 60–62 [2004] (Isr.). For a description 
of the Cave of the Patriarchs, see The Cave of Machpelah Tomb of the Patriarchs, 
JEWISHVIRTUALLIBRARY.ORG, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/machpelah.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2014). 
 184 HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 56 [2004] (Isr.). 
 185 Id. at 59 (“In the original response of the State to the petitions, it was argued that the sole purpose of 
the requisition order was security-oriented, and it did not serve as a disguise for achieving any other purpose. It 
was made in direct response to the continuing risk of terrorist acts, which consistently threatened the Jewish 
inhabitants who used the worshippers’ route, and in view of the responsibility of the IDF commander to ensure 
their safety.”). 
 186 Id. at 56. 
 187 Id. at 57. 
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a. First Proportionality Test: Rational Connection 
Soon after the order to widen the road, the petitioners brought a complaint 
that protested the order because, among other reasons, archeologically 
important buildings from the Mamluk period and other houses intended for 
conservation would be destroyed in order to widen the road.188 The petitioners 
also argued that Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the 
destruction of property unless this action is essential and required for military 
operations.189 The respondents asserted that Article 23(g) of the Hague 
Convention allows the occupying power “to destroy or seize the enemy’s 
property, [only if] such destruction or seizure [is] imperatively demanded by 
the necessities of war,” and that Article 52 of the Hague Convention allows 
land to be requisitioned to ensure order and public security even when there is 
no combat.190 
The Court held that the military commander’s request passed 
proportionality review.191 The order passed the first test of a rational 
connection, mainly because the military commander enjoyed a presumption 
that his purposes did not aim at any ulterior motive.192 Given the “bitter 
experience[s]” of multiple and recent attacks on the worshippers, the Court 
determined that widening the path related only to increasing security for the 
worshippers using the route.193 The worshippers’ (and security officers’) 
genuine vulnerability, based on the topographic characteristics of the route, 
further proved the measure was strictly security-based.194 The Court 
emphasized that the commander had the right and duty to protect the lives of 
the worshippers and security officers, even if they were present at that site in 
contradiction to international law.195 More controversially, the Court held that 
 
 188 Id. at 58. See generally James Waterson, The Mamluks, HISTORYTODAY.COM, http://www. 
historytoday.com/james-waterson/mamluks (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).  
 189 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.  
 190 Hass, PD 58 at 70 (quoting Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties and Neutral Pow-
ers and Persons During War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 52). 
 191 Id. at 60. 
 192 Id. at 68. 
 193 Id. at 69.  
 194 Id. at 69.  
 195 Id. at 70.  
In addition to the responsibility of the area commander to ensure the security of the military force 
that he commands, he must ensure the safety, security and welfare of the inhabitants of the area. 
He owes this duty to all the inhabitants, without any distinction as to their identity—Jews, Arabs 
or foreigners. The question whether the residency of various parts of the population is legal does 
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the military commander also had the right and duty to protect the worshippers’ 
fundamental freedom of worship, even if such protection limited the property 
rights of the petitioners, who were protected persons.196 Scholars have 
criticized this logic and argued that international law only provides that the 
military commander shall protect the human rights of protected persons and 
not persons of the occupying State.197 
The HCJ first found that the respondents had the right to freedom of 
worship. As such freedom constitutes “one of the basic human rights . . . 
related to the realization of individuality” and “a constitutional right of 
supreme status” as discussed in previous cases.198 Such basic right had been 
codified in Israeli law under the Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, 
which guaranteed worshipers the right to visit certain holy sites without 
receiving injury to religious sensibilities.199 Despite the “supreme status” of the 
right to exercise religion in Israeli law, the Court cited precedent stating that 
“freedom of religion and worship is not an absolute freedom [and] a balance 
must be found between it and other rights and values that are worthy of 
protection, including the value of private property.”200 
Most notably, the Court did not discuss the right to life and security as one 
of the rights claimed by the respondents. Thus, the Court did not explore 
whether the respondents stood for two fundamental rights, which might have 
tipped the scales toward their case before a proportionality analysis.201 
 
not come before us today for a determination. Their very residency in the area leads to the duty of 
the area commander to protect their lives and their human rights. This is part of the humanitarian 
sphere for which the military force is responsible in a belligerent occupation. 
HCJ 72/86 Zaloom v. IDF Commander for Judea and Samaria 41(1) PD 528 [1986] (Isr.); see also HCJ 469/83 
Hebron Nat’l United Bus Co.v. Minister of Def. [1992] (Isr.); HCJ 4363/02 Zindah v. IDF Commander in Ga-
za Strip [2002] (Isr.); HCJ 4212/02 Gussin v. IDF Commander 56(4) 608 [2002] (Isr.). 
 196 Id. at 71.  
The inhabitants of the area have a constitutional right to freedom of religion and worship. This is 
the case for the Arab inhabitants and it is also the case for the Jewish inhabitants who live there. 
The inhabitants of the area also have the right of freedom of movement, by means of which it is 
possible to realize, inter alia, the right of access to holy places. 
Id.; see also HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 19 [2005] (Isr.). 
 197 See generally Gross, supra note 154. 
 198 HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 71 [2004] (Isr.). 
 199 Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727–1967, 21 LSI 76 (1966–67) (Isr.). 
 200 HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 71 [2004] (Isr.). 
 201 But see Aeyal M. Gross, supra note 4, at 395 (“[T]he HCJ does not challenge this occupation’s basic 
structure, which views the settlers’ rights as security concerns that can justify placing restrictions on the rights 
of the local residents.”). 
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b. Lack of Pre-Balancing Analysis and Conflating the Second and Third 
Tests 
The Court determined that the security measure satisfied proportionality 
because the military commander reduced the security surrounding the footpath 
to “only to a minimum level,” beyond which “every other alternative was far 
more costly in terms of the security risks;” while at the same time the 
commander “reduced to a minimum the harm to private property along the 
route.”202 In these statements, the Court conflated the second and third 
proportionality tests together. The Court deemed a security measure that 
employed a least restrictive means as automatically satisfying the third 
“narrow proportionality” test, i.e., a measure that reflected a fair trade-off 
between the competing rights. However, whether the act was actually 
proportional according to the third test—whether the means of increasing 
human rights of the petitioners justified the decrease in security for the 
respondents—is a different question from whether the military commander 
employed the least restrictive means. 
The Court held that the security measure was proportional in the strict 
sense because it minimized damage to cultural property while ensuring “only a 
minimum [but feasible level] of security measures” to protect the lives of the 
worshippers.203 To create this minimum but feasible level of security, the 
commander reduced the original width of part of the security route from eight 
meters to six meters, which resulted in the destruction of only two and a half 
uninhabited archeological buildings, rather than thirteen.204 On the other hand, 
with only six meters of pathway rather than eight, the path could only handle 
one-way traffic of security and rescue vehicles, rather than two-way traffic.205 
The military commander and the Court recognized that the loss of bi-
directional traffic would cause an increased security risk for the worshippers 
and security personnel.206 At least theoretically, the military commander traded 
the security, and possibly the lives, of the worshippers and security personal 
for the protection of property. Nevertheless, the Court confirmed this action as 
 
 202 Id. at 78. (The opinion discusses the recent dangers posed by terrorists on worshippers and security 
personnel. But nowhere in the opinion do the judges discuss the probable risk of injury or death caused by the 
reduction of the security road from allowing bidirectional traffic to only allowing unidirectional traffic.). 
 203 Id. (The commander reduced security to the point such that “every other alternative was far more cost-
ly in terms of the security risks to the worshippers and the harm and damage anticipated to the inhabitants of 
the area.”). 
 204 Id. at 61. The property owners of the two and half buildings received just compensation. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 61. 
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proportional in the strict sense even though it only found that the least 
restrictive means had been employed.207 
Because it found an apparently proportional outcome, the Court declined to 
perform a pre-balance weighing of the rights.208 As the Court stated, “in view 
of the facts of the concrete case, the balance between them satisfie[d]” 
proportionality; therefore there was no need to adopt a decisive position with 
regard to the relative value of the conflicting rights.209 However, had the Court 
evaluated the relative importance of the rights in question before balancing 
them, the Court might have determined that a proportional result in the strict 
sense had not been achieved. 
3. A Lack of Rationality 
Because the Court declined to weigh the conflicting rights before balancing 
them, its decision in Haas conflicts with prior HCJ precedent210 and lacks 
rationality.211 As discussed above, the Court never examined the importance of 
protecting uninhabited archeological property as compared to the right of 
worship, let alone the right of security and bodily integrity, before proceeding 
with a proportionality analysis. Another flaw in the Court’s reasoning is that 
the Court did not analyze the right to life and security as a right that should 
limit the protection of cultural property.212 Security and the right to life did not 
serve as added rights for the side of the respondents that would weigh against 
the rights of the petitioners.213 The Court did not examine the actual nature of 
the security need for bi-directional traffic of security vehicles. 
 
 207 See id. at 78. 
 208 Id. at 77. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.; see infra notes 211, 212. 
 211 Horev, PD at 198 (holding that a standard for judging between different rights in general, based on 
their social value, must be found before commencing a particular judicial balancing consideration). Here, the 
Court did discuss the importance of the different rights in isolation from each other. 
 212 Hass, PD at 75–77. 
 213 Id. at 77. (The Court only looked at security as a consideration that might prevent the military com-
mander from even allowing the worshippers to visit the Cave of the Patriarchs. This question of balancing se-
curity against whether the worshippers should even earn protection from the government constituted the “first 
stage” of the balancing process. Only after the Court determined that the right to worship at the Cave of 
Machpeleh outweighed fundamental safety concerns did the Court proceed to weigh the petitioners’ protection 
of cultural property against the respondents’ right to worship.). 
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The Court in Haas skipped over a principle it stated in an earlier case, 
Sabih v. Commander of IDF forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria, which 
explored a similar trade-off between security and human rights: 
The different material dictates, in itself, different methods of inter-
vention. Indeed, an act of state and an act of war do not change their 
character also if the same are subject to the court’s supervision, and 
the character of the acts, naturally, makes an imprint on the modes of 
intervention.214 
Similarly, the Court contradicted what it would state in a later case, Mara’abe 
v. The Prime Minister of Israel, which involved the building of a security 
fence: 
The solution is not in assignment of absolute weight to one of the 
considerations; the solution is in assignment of relative weights to the 
various considerations, while balancing between them at the point of 
decision.215 
The Court gave no standard of weight or magnitude of harm for the destruction 
of uninhabited property with archeological value relative to the probability of 
loss of life. It thereby compromised its consistency and credibility by declaring 
acts proportional without considering if the act struck a true balance based on 
the relative value of the rights.216 
Had the Court evaluated the relative importance of the conflicting rights, it 
might have determined that enhancing protection of cultural property while 
diminishing the effectiveness of a security road did not actually create a 
proportional result. For instance, if the Court had found that security and the 
right to life already greatly outweighed protection of cultural property in 
general, then it would have required a much greater benefit in protection of 
 
 214 HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria PD 369 [1996] 
(Isr.). 
 215 See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 19 [2005] (Isr.) See also HCJ 
501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 192 [1997] (Isr.) (“A decision’s reasonableness is assessed 
by balancing between competing values, according to their respective weight.” (emphasis added)); HCJ 14/86 
Laor v. The Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987] (Isr.) (“[N]ot all principles are of identical 
significance in society’s eyes. Thus, in the absence of legislative direction, the Court must assess the relative 
social importance of the different values. Just as there is no person without a shadow, so too, there is no prin-
ciple without weight. Balance on the basis of weight necessarily implies a social assessment of the relative 
importance of the different principles.”). 
 216 See Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, Proportionality: A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the 
ICON Controversy, 10 INT. J. CONST. L. 687, 692 (2012) (“It is true that balancing cannot do without moral 
reasoning. Only a very naïve approach would arrive at the conclusion that any legal reasoning could be value-
free and deprived of any moral considerations.”). 
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cultural property to balance against any detriment to security and the right to 
life. Alternatively, it may have determined that no benefit to the protection of 
cultural property could ever justify any decrease in the right to life and 
security.217 Or, it may have found that the security risk created by reducing the 
security road to unidirectional traffic was only minimal and that the only 
benefit reduced was mere psychological comfort; and therefore sacrificing two 
and a half buildings for psychological comfort was proportionate (or 
disproportionate). 
That the Court did not perform a closer analysis to determine a different 
outcome is understandable for two reasons. First, the Court’s only task in this 
case was to determine whether the military commander broke the law by 
destroying the two and a half pieces of cultural property. The Court was not 
required to analyze the case in greater detail to determine a better plan of 
action for the military commander. Second, the Court showed legitimate 
deference to the military commander, and did not have the authority question 
his judgment as long as he stayed within the bounds of the law.218 The Court 
judges cases on the principle that “when the decision of the military 
commander relies upon military knowledge, the Court grants special weight to 
the military expertise of the commander of the area.”219 However, it would 
have been interesting and perhaps preferable had the Court further analyzed the 
case (perhaps in a dicta portion of the opinion) to determine whether the final 
result fit with the Court’s prior definition of a “proportional trade-off.”220 Was 
the Court being as precise as it could have when it described destroying only 
two and a half pieces of cultural property, rather than thirteen, and thereby only 
 
 217 See e.g., HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. IsrLR 153, 193 [1997] (“[T]here are some interests 
against which there can be no balancing. For example, when the State of Israel’s very existence was placed on 
the scales, this Court refused to weigh between that interest and competing interests.”). 
 218 See HCJ 7979/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 1, 18 [2005] (Isr.). 
 219 Id. at 23 (citing HCJ 390/79 Duikat v. The Gov’t of Isr. 34(1) PD 1, 25 [1979] (Isr.); HCJ 258/79 
Amira v. Minister of Def. 34(1) PD 90, 92 [1979] (Isr.); HCJ 1005/89 Aga v. Commander of the IDF Forces in 
the Gaza Strip Area 44(1) PD 536, 539 [1990] (Isr.)). Perhaps the Court in Haas was working on the unspoken 
assumption that the commander’s security order fell within the “of reasonableness” established by prior HCJ 
decisions. According to the “zone of reasonableness” concept, judges admit that weighing conflicting values is 
not an exact science, and that different alternative balances could all fall within a zone of reasonableness. A 
judge overrules a government’s decision only when the measure taken by the government or commander fell 
outside of this zone; see Horev, PD at 381. 
 220 This would not have been the first time that the Court would re-analyze or re-frame its holding. For 
instance, in Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense the Court entered into a proportionality analysis of the military 
commander’s decision, despite overturning his order for a different reason. HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Min-
ister of Def. 1–2 [2008] (Isr.). 
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building a single lane security road, rather than a two-way security road, as 
actually proportionate? 
Even though the Court was not required to further analyze the case to 
determine a different holding, perhaps it should have used this analysis to 
avoid deeming a possibly disproportionate result as proportionate. Indeed, as 
the Court stated in Horev, “[B]alancing ought to be based on a generalization 
that also allows for the resolution of future cases . . . a rational principle ought 
to be formulated.”221 Because the Court did not do a pre balancing evaluation 
of the rights, it declined to help resolve future cases that would grapple with 
similar issues.222 By declining to perform such an evaluation, perhaps the 
Court in this case began to establish or strengthen a trend of deeming results 
proportionate without actually analyzing the genuine proportionality of those 
results. It thus weakened its own credibility by declaring an act as 
proportionate more from a stance of conviction and less from a rational 
measurement of the trade-off between benefits and detriments.223 
2. Beit Sourik 
In Beit Sourik, the HCJ ruled on the legality of the controversial224 security 
fence built by the Israeli government and the Minister’s Committee on 
National Security225 in response to a wave of terror attacks in the early part of 
the last decade.226 The government and the Minister’s Committee intended to 
build the fence to hold back the wave of attacks.227 For each intended portion 
of the fence under scrutiny, the Court confirmed that security was the only 
objective, and that there were no ulterior motives inherent in these portions of 
 
 221 Horev, PD at 196. 
 222 HCJ 10356/02 Haas v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 58(3) PD 53, 77 [2004] (Isr.). 
 223 Cf. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1979). 
 224 See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 3–4 [2004] (Isr.). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 1. (“In September 2000, the Palestinian side began a campaign of terror against Israel and Israe-
lis. Terror attacks take place both in the area and in Israel. They are directed against citizens and soldiers, men 
and women, elderly and infants, regular citizens and public figures. Terror attacks are carried out everywhere: 
in public transportation, in shopping centers and markets, in coffee houses and in restaurants. Terror organiza-
tions use gunfire attacks, suicide attacks, mortar fire, Katyusha rocket fire, and car bombs. From September 
2000 until the beginning of April 2004, more than 780 attacks were carried out within Israel. During the same 
period, more than 8200 attacks were carried out in the area. The armed conflict claimed (as of April 2004) the 
lives of 900 Israeli citizens and residents. More than 6000 were injured, some with serious wounds that have 
left them severely handicapped. The armed conflict has left many dead and wounded on the Palestinian side as 
well. Bereavement and pain wash over us.”). 
 227 Id. at 3–4. 
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the fence, such as land grabs.228 Thus, each intended section under scrutiny 
passed the first proportionality test: finding a rational connection between the 
military’s stated objectives and the means of achieving those objectives.229 
The Court then analyzed four different sections of the proposed fence that 
the petitioners claimed disproportionately injured their rights.230 In each 
instance, the military commander sought to move the fence farther from Israeli 
villages and closer to Palestinian villages.231 This placement would achieve 
two basic security goals: allowing more of a vantage point over Palestinian 
villages and weak points in the fence, and creating a buffer between the fence 
and Israeli villages, such that the IDF would have more time to respond and 
catch a terrorist breaching the fence.232 If the fence were built closer to the 
Israeli villages, these two advantages would be lost.233 Yet, the petitioners 
sought to scale the fence back, closer to the Israeli villages.234 The petitioners 
wished to move the fence away from their towns to prevent their villagers from 
being separated from important land and buildings.235 
a. Declining to Consider the Claims on Their Own Terms 
As in Haas, the Court declined to compare the conflicting rights to each 
other before commencing a proportionality review.236 In many ways, the 
oversights of the Court in Beit Sourik are more apparent. First, the Court does 
not clearly define the security rights at issue. The Court did not discuss the 
actual threat to life and security that each section of the fence was built to 
prevent. 
On the other hand, it clearly defined the injuries to the petitioners. For 
instance, in analyzing the first section of the fence, the Court claimed that this 
section of fence would severely impair the free movement and property rights 
 
 228 See generally id. at 32, 38–39, 41. 
 229 Id. 
 230 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 3–4 [2004] (Isr.). 
 231 Id. 
 232 See generally id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 33–34 [2004] (Isr.). In paragraph 57, the 
Court begins a proportionality analysis of the first section of the fence under review. Until paragraph 59, which 
employs a narrow proportionality review (whether the goal could be slightly reduced while greatly mitigating 
damage to the restricted party), the Court did not discuss any standard by which the rights of the petitioners—
free access to important land and buildings—should be weighed against security and the right to life.  
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of 13,000 farmers by cutting them off from thousands of acres of farmland and 
thousands of productive trees, and by setting up a license system for access, 
which would allow access to these lands from only two points in the fence, and 
only at specific times of day.237 This situation would create long lines for the 
farmers to access their farms, would make vehicle access to the farms difficult, 
would create distance between the farmers and their farms, as there would only 
be two entrances by which to access the farms: all of these restrictions 
together, according to the Court, would stifle development and change the 
farmer’s lives completely, and thus constituted severe impairments on free 
movement and property rights for thousands of people.238 
On the other hand, according to the Court, moving the fence closer to the 
Israeli villages would only create a “minute difference” in security.239 
However, this difference in security is “minute,” according to the Court, only 
in comparison to the injury to the petitioners: 
The gap between the security provided by the military commander’s 
approach and the security provided by the alternate route is minute, 
as compared to the large difference between a fence that separates 
the local inhabitants from their lands, and a fence which does not 
separate the two (or which creates a separation which is smaller and 
possible to live with).240 
Like in Haas, the Court here does not evaluate the competing rights before 
balancing them. The Court does not attempt to consider the reduction in 
security on its own terms. It does not determine if moving the fence closer to 
the Israeli villages would result in certain death, or how many deaths, or near 
certain death or injury, or how many injuries. What might be a major loss of 
security in general terms is reduced to a “minute difference” only after a 
comparison with the damage to the petitioner’s rights. Thus the Court does not 
determine exactly what goal the respondents claimed. The analysis of the other 
three portions of the fence contained this same pattern.241 
 
 237 Id. at 34–35. 
 238 Id. at 38–39. 
 239 Id. at 35. 
 240 Id. (emphasis added). 
 241 Id. at 38. “The difficulties we mentioned regarding the previous order apply here as well. As we have 
seen, it is possible to lessen this damage substantially if the route of the separation fence passing east and west 
of Har Adar is changed, reducing the area of agricultural lands lying beyond the fence. The security advantage 
(in comparison to the possible alternate route) which the military commander wishes to achieve is not propor-
tionate to the severe injury to the farmers (according to the route proposed by the military commander) (em-
phasis added)”; id. at 39–40 (“We are convinced that the security advantage achieved by the route, as deter-
mined by the military commander, in comparison with the alternate route, is in no way proportionate to the 
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Even less does the Court discuss the relative of importance of the 
petitioners’ and the respondents’ rights.242 The Court does not assign relative 
weights to the competing interests before balancing them together, contrary to 
established case precedent that would require this analysis.243 Possibly, the 
Court had no qualms about employing this less disciplined proportionality 
review because of decisions like Haas that previously had declined to evaluate 
the weight of the competing rights before balancing. 
b. Implications 
Theoretically it is possible that the Court in Beit Sourik ruled for the 
proportionate result. Perhaps the reduction in security for all four parts of the 
fence was actually minimal. And perhaps that minimal reduction in security 
balanced fairly against the increase in human rights for the petitioners. 
Unfortunately, the public will not know whether a proportionate result was 
actually achieved, because the Court does not depict the security that was 
sacrificed. Nor does it depict how lost security—on its own terms—compares 
to the human rights of the petitioners. 
Thus, the decision, as well as the Haas decision, does not actualize one of 
the main benefits of proportionality review discussed earlier in the comment, 
that of diffusing political strife through rational decision-making. As discussed 
earlier, the Court in a proportionality review is involved in “balancing between 
conflicting interests and values.”244 Necessarily, then, the Court is involved in 
 
additional injury to the lives of the local inhabitants caused by this order.” (emphasis added)); id. at 41–43 
(putting forth a similar analysis with no discussion of the nature of the competing rights or their values consid-
ered independently of one another.). 
 242 Cf. HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. Israel PD 1, 27–28 [2005] (Isr.) (“In the case before us, 
we are presented with a conflict between two basic rights of equal weight . . . . [B]oth the freedom of worship 
and the freedom of movement have been recognized in our case law as being on the highest level of the scale 
of rights . . . . In addition, with regard to both of them an identical balancing formula has been applied in order 
to balance them against the same public interests . . . . The result implied by the conclusion that we are con-
cerned with a conflict between two rights of equal weight is that the balance required in this case is a horizon-
tal balance, which will allow the coexistence of both of these rights.”). 
 243 Cf. HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria PD, 369 [1996] 
(Isr.) (emphasis added). (“Different subjects require different methods of intervention. Indeed, acts of state and 
acts of war do not change their character just because they are subject to the review of the judiciary, and the 
character of the acts, according to the nature of things, imprints its mark on the methods of intervention.”); 
HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 21 [2005] (Isr.) (citations omitted) (“The 
solution is not to assign absolute weight to one of the considerations; the solution is to assign relative weights 
to the various considerations, while balancing between them at the point of decision[.]”). 
 244 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 193 [1997] (Isr.). 
KLEINMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 1/22/2015 12:26 PM 
2015] ISRAEL’S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 627 
“placing competing values on the scale”245 and determining whether a 
reduction in certain benefits weighs equally—within a zone of 
reasonableness246—with a corresponding increase in liberties and rights. In 
order for this balancing process to make sense, the Court must know the 
weight of the values it places on the scale. Furthermore, it can only determine 
the weight of these values relative to each other. As the Court stated: “balance 
on the basis of weight necessarily implies a social assessment [i.e. a weighing] 
of the relative importance of the different principles” before the balancing 
process.247 A social value, such as freedom of movement, does not have 
absolute weight: “[t]he weight of any social principle is relative. The status of 
any fundamental principle is always assessed in relation to that of other 
principles with which it is likely to conflict.”248 The public was given no way 
to understand why certain security measures should be limited by other human 
rights because the Court did not explain why promoting those human rights 
should limit security and the right to life in principle.249 
By declining to weigh the values against each other before balancing in 
order to determine which weights would actually go “on the scale,” the Court 
in Beit Sourik did not conclusively determine the best trade-off between 
governmental goals and human rights. Therefore, the decision does not diffuse 
political strife, because the public will not know if the Court determined a 
rational, proportional trade-off that objectively “weighs the costs against the 
benefits.”250 
 
 245 Id. (citing HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’Am Company Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior, PD 7, 871, 879 [1953] 
(Isr.)). (“This was the Court’s approach regarding the conflict between freedom of expression and preserving 
public peace . . . in the clash between freedom of movement and public security[.]”)(internal citations omitted). 
 246 HCJ 7957/04 Mara’be v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 10 [2005] (Isr.). 
 247 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. 
The Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987]). 
 248 Id. at 192 (citing CA 105/92 Re’em Eng’rs and Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of  Upper Nazareth, 
47(5) PD 189 [1993]). 
 249 Cf. The Margin of Appreciation, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ 
lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/Paper2_en.asp (“The right to life cannot be balanced either against other rights or 
against the lawful pursuit of law enforcement goals, because it is strongly prioritized by the “absolute necessi-
ty” test . . . . Balancing the rights protected by this article against other rights or against any public interest is 
therefore not appropriate.”). 
 250 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Isr. PD 1, 34 [2004] (Isr.). 
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3. Abu Safiyeh 
One of the most recent decisions where the HCJ balanced security against 
human rights is Abu Safiyeh v. The Minister of Defense.251 In this case, the 
military commander issued an order prohibiting all Palestinians living in the 
West Bank from accessing Route 443 without a travel permit.252 Road 443 
constituted one of the main traffic arteries connecting the West Bank to 
Israel.253 This travel order carried a long list of detriments for the petitioners: 
they were forced to travel through an alternative route that is winding, narrow, 
and in disrepair, thereby lengthening necessary travel time and cost; moreover, 
the travel order cut off access to the city of Ramallah, which caused the closing 
of businesses, cut off access to educational, emergency, and medical facilities, 
and harmed social relationships; and finally, the order prevented direct access 
to the petitioners’ farming lands, and also transferred traffic congestion on to 
internal roads, which had led to an increase in traffic accidents.254 
The respondents argued that the travel order was necessary for the security 
of Israelis travelling on the road and that it was a temporary order issued only 
in response to a series of “brutal and murderous terrorist attacks . . . .”255 The 
order was intended to reduce the likely recurrence of former terror incidents 
including a car bombing, a drive-by shooting followed by an escape to a 
nearby village, the kidnapping of Israelis travelling on the road, and the 
transportation of terrorists and weapons into the territory of the State of 
Israel.256 The respondents cited a marked decrease in terror incidents after the 
issuance of the travel order, as well as a continuing threat of terror attacks 
necessitating the travel order.257 Respondents also claimed that the petitioners 
exaggerated their claims because the alternative route provided “a reasonable 
connection among the villages themselves and between the villages and the 
city of Ramallah,” and also because the Israeli government was then spending 
the equivalent of millions of dollars to construct “fabric of life roads” that 
would provide a better option than the current alternative route, thus providing 
a reasonable alternative to travel along Route 443.258 Thus, respondents 
 
 251 HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 1, 46 [2007] (Isr.). 
 252 Id. at 9. 
 253 Id. at 6. 
 254 Id. at 9. 
 255 Id. at 11. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 11–12. Respondents cited fifty-eight recent incidents where Palestinians threw stones or incendi-
ary devices at Israeli cars travelling on the road. 
 258 Id. at 12. 
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characterized that the case was a conflict between “inconvenience and [the] 
right to life and physical safety[,]” and therefore that the Court should not even 
consider a proportionality review of the issue.259 
The Court entered that proportionality review and found that the restrictive 
travel order satisfied the rational connection test.260 The Court found that the 
restriction was “extremely prejudicial,” at first, and implicitly agreed with the 
petitioners that it included not only a restriction on the freedom of movement 
but also on additional rights, “including the right to earn a living and to live 
with dignity, the right to education and to maintain contact with family 
members, and the right to health and to receive medical treatment.”261 
However, the Court found that the opening of the Beit Ur–Beituniya “fabric of 
life” road “led to a real reduction of the damage to the quality of the 
Palestinian residents’ lives[,]” and that although the road “[i]ndisputably . . . is 
not a fast highway like Road 443, but a two-lane road of lower quality[,]” it 
nevertheless “appears to be capable of providing the residents of the villages 
with direct access to the regional city.”262 
Despite the fact that the fabric of life road had reduced almost all 
detriments to the petitioners—the Court implied that the “the inconvenience 
caused to the petitioners by the travel restrictions applying to them represents 
an indirect and limited infringement of their rights[]”—the Court nevertheless 
ruled the travel order disproportionate.263 The Court’s reasoning was as 
follows: The Israeli government had originally built Route 443 for the benefit 
of the petitioners and all West Bank Palestinians, and it had done so by 
expropriating their land, and in time, Israelis would use the road as a main 
traffic artery to access the West Bank.264 After the travel order excluding 
Palestinians from Route 443 was issued, there began to be a “complete 
exclusion of the residents of the Area from a road that was intended to serve 
 
 259 Id. at 15. See also HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 193 [1997] (Isr.) (“[T]here 
are some interests against which there can be no balancing. For example, when the State of Israel’s very exist-
ence was placed on the scales, this Court refused to weigh between that interest and competing interests.” (cit-
ing IA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee 19(3) PD 373, 373 [1965] (Isr.))). 
 260 HCJ 2150/70 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense PD 1, 33 [2008] (Isr.). 
 261 Id. at 37. 
 262 Id. at 39. 
 263 Abu Safiyeh, PD at 39, 40 (quoting HCJ 6379/07 Comm. of the Dolev Settlement v. IDF Commander 
in the Judaea and Samaria Area [2008] (Isr.)).  
 264 Id. at 12, 17. 
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them, in favor of Israeli traffic that runs primarily between the coastal plain 
and Jerusalem.”265 Therefore, the Chief Justice stated: 
As I see it, under those circumstances, the indiscriminate ban on trav-
el that was imposed upon the Palestinian residents of the Area does 
not fulfill the third sub-test of proportionality. This is because suffi-
cient weight was not ascribed to preserving the rights of those resi-
dents as “protected persons.”266 
Essentially, the Chief Justice tilted the scales toward the petitioners because 
their rights as protected persons had been breached by the travel order. 
According to Article 43 of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land of 1907, appended to the Fourth Hague Convention, an 
occupying state is obligated to “ensure, as far as possible, public security and 
safety” of occupied peoples (which the Court uses interchangeably with the 
term “protected persons”).267 When the military expropriated land from 
protected persons,268 and then later determined that the land could only be used 
by the occupying power, it thereby breached its international law obligations to 
those protected persons.269 
In this case, the Court was transparent about which factors would add 
weight to each of the parties’ claims. The Court showed that as it analyzed the 
proportionality of the measure, it would add weight to the petitioners’ claims 
because the military infringed upon their rights as protected persons. Thus the 
Court assessed the weight of the rights in question before balancing them. This 
assessment of the weight of rights is necessary in a proportionality review, 
because, as mentioned, “[b]alance on the basis of weight necessarily implies a 
social assessment [i.e. a weighing] of the relative importance of the different 
principles” before the balancing process.270 
However, the Court gave no explanation—based on precedent271 or any 
other reasons—of the relative importance of the right to life and security and 
the petitioners’ rights under international law as protected persons. As 
 
 265 Id. at 40. 
 266 Id. (emphasis added). 
 267 Id. (quoting Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex I art. 
43, 36 Stat. 2227, U.N.T.S. 539). 
 268 Id. at 2, 17. 
 269 Id. at 29. 
 270 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing HCJ 14/86 Laor v. 
Film and Play Review Bd. 41(1) PD 421, 434 [1987] (Isr.)). 
 271 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.; see notes 211–212.  
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mentioned, a pre-balance weighing of rights alone is not sufficient for a proper 
proportionality review. The Court stated that it must determine and justify the 
relative importance of the rights at issue: 
A social value . . . does not have “absolute weight.” The weight of 
any social principle is relative. The status of any fundamental princi-
ple is always assessed in relation to that of other principles with 
which it is likely to conflict.272 
The Court offered no explanation of the relative importance of the petitioners’ 
rights as protected persons and the respondents’ fundamental right to life and 
security. It did not explain why the petitioners’ rights as protected persons 
should, in general, weigh significantly against the respondent’s right to life. 
Thus, the Court’s conclusion that proportionality demands lifting the travel 
ban is questionable. The Court did not necessarily achieve a fair and balanced 
trade-off between security benefits and human rights detriments. The Court 
does not explain why the petitioners’ rights as protected persons factored so 
heavily in limiting the respondents’ security and right to life (especially when 
the respondents’ core claim was for detriments to their freedom of movement). 
Thus, the Court does not explain why the holding satisfies proportionality. As 
mentioned, ruling on a certain trade-off between competing values gains more 
credibility when judges are realistic, rational, and open about the relative 
importance of those values. Ironically, when the Court does not explain the 
relative importance of the values at issue, the decision comes out as 
 
 272 HCJ 501/96 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 198 [1997] (Isr.) (citing CA 105/92 Re’em 
Eng’rs and Contractors Ltd. v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth PD 47(5) 189, 205 [1993] (Isr.)).  
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“arbitrary”273 and “paternalistic”274, which is exactly what the Court was trying 
to avoid by using proportionality review.275 
CONCLUSION 
As this Comment has shown, proportionality review offers multiple 
benefits to a society employing this review. Proportionality review expands the 
rights that a Court will protect, even non-fundamental rights, such as the 
religious feelings found in Horev. Proportionality review allows more 
politically insulated judges to take a second look at governmental decisions 
that limit human rights, to determine not only whether the government unduly 
limited a given right, but also whether it could have achieved its goal more 
efficiently without limiting rights as severely. Furthermore, proportionality 
review diffuses political strife by expanding the array of rights that a society 
will protect as constitutionally guaranteed. Relatedly, proportionality review 
diffuses strife by reframing political disputes as objective trade-offs between 
concrete benefits and detriments, such as was the case in Horev, where 
proportionality review transformed a deadlock battle between religious and 
secular values into an objective trade-off between a two minute detour and 
severely damaged religious feelings. 
As shown, in order for proportionality review to work, especially with 
regards to the third test, judges must first determine the general, relative 
importance of the rights and goals at issue. Since proportionality review 
requires judges to decide whether certain rights and goals should gain more or 
less protection, judges must necessarily determine the relative importance of 
 
 273 See Cohen-Eliya, supra note 33, at 266; see also Steven Greer, The Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?, UCL HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 3 
(2010) (“All commentators agree that no simple formula can describe how the margin of appreciation [another 
term for proportionality review] works and that, in spite of the mountain of jurisprudence and analysis, its most 
striking characteristic remains its casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable nature.”). 
 274 Horev v. Minister of Transp. 51(4) PD 153, 196 [1997] (Isr.) (citing FH 9/77 Israel Elec. Co. v. 
Ha’Aretz Newspaper Publ’ns 32(3) PD 337, 361 [1978] (Isr.)). See Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, 
NEW REPUBLIC, at 6–7 (Apr. 23, 2007) (calling Barak a “legal buccaneer” and “enlightened despot”). See also 
Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy and the Fight Against Terrorism, 35 H.K. L.J. 
287, 287–89 (2005) (“[O]ne of the lessons of the Holocaust and of the Second World War is the need to have 
democratic constitutions and ensure that they are put into effect by supreme court judges whose main task is to 
protect democracy . . . the main role of the supreme court judge in a democracy is to maintain and protect the 
constitution and democracy . . . . Judicial protection of democracy in general and of human rights in particular 
characterises the development of most modern democracies.). Here, the former Chief Justice implies that in 
modern society, the judicial branch is the superior organ charged with preserving democracy.  
 275 Cohen-Eliya, supra note 22, at 266. 
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those rights in the overall scheme of constitutional values.276 (Deciding 
whether the right to life should limit the right to speed, and how much, must 
depend on the relative value of these rights in the overall scheme of social 
values.277) 
This comment showed the Court in Horev systematically weighing the 
rights at issue before beginning a proportionality review. This evaluation of the 
relative weight of the values at issue ensured that the decision was based on 
objective criteria, rationality, and precedent.278 On the other hand, the Court in 
at least three decisions—Haas and Beit Sourik, and Abu Safiyeh—declined to 
determine the relative value of the rights and goals at issue in any systematic or 
rational way based on precedent. The Court’s reluctance to enter this 
discussion of the relative importance of the rights at issue compromised its 
holding in each case. The public was given no way to understand why certain 
security measures should be limited by other human rights because the Court 
did not explain why promoting those human rights should limit security and 
the right to life in principle. 
A look back at history might help the justices of the HCJ to determine a 
better path for the future. After the Second World War, Germany began 
officially using proportionality review.279 As a basis for that review, the 
German Constitutional Court set up a systematic hierarchy of values, or 
Wertrangordnung.280 The relative position and importance of each value would 
be determined in reference to the supreme value of Germany: human 
dignity.281 This hierarchy of values would provide a framework for rationally 
deciding proportionality questions. Major criticism of this approach developed 
in Germany.282 Critics claimed that judges have no expertise in weighing 
values283 and that elected officials should bear that responsibility for the 
represented public;284 they also claimed that judges would determine this 
hierarchy of values arbitrarily and based on their own beliefs.285 Therefore, in 
 
 276 Id. at 267 (citing Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review and Representation, 3 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 572 (2005)). 
 277 Id. See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 1, 21 [2005] (Isr.). 
 278 See supra Parts II.B. and II.C.  
 279 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 22, at 465. 
 280 Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 268. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id.  
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response to this impending “tyranny of the judges,”286 the German Court 
decided that any proportionality review based on the third test—where judges 
would disagree with elected officials on the proper balance between policy 
goals and human liberties—could only be decided if there was a clear lack of 
proportionality in the government’s decision.287 This decision flowed from the 
fact that judges using proportionality would have to determine a hierarchy of 
rights, and that determining this hierarchy of values inevitably involves 
arbitrariness and personal belief.288 
The Israeli Court could try the approach that Germany has chosen.289 In 
close calls, where finding a proper balance between security and liberty turns 
on the assignment of values to the conflicting rights,290 such restraint might 
prevent judges from ruling based on arbitrary or unexplained preference for 
one value over another (as arguably happened in the three cases discussed). Or, 
the Court could implement what Iddo Porat has called the “dual model of 
balancing.”291 In this model, a court would only employ the third 
proportionality test when balancing two conflicting rights of the same 
importance and magnitude: a conflict between a lower-order value and a 
higher-order value would not occur.292 This would keep lower-order and 
higher-order values separate and would prevent a judge from encroaching on a 
higher-order right by arbitrarily exaggerating the importance of a lower-order 
right.293 
 
 286 Cohen-Eliya, supra note 4, at 267. 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id. at 268. 
 289 Id. at 269. 
 290 See Christopher Michaelsen, The Proportionality Principle, Counter-Terrorism Laws and Human 
Rights, 2 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 19, 22 (2010) (“[T]he great majority of commentators on both sides of the 
equation argue that in order to protect liberal democracy from the scourge of international terrorism, a ‘bal-
ance’ must be struck between security and liberty. Where this balance falls, of course, depends on the political 
colours of the respective commentator.”). 
 291 Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in 
Constitutional Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2006). 
 292 Id. at 1395. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 98.  
 293 Other scholars suggest that liberty and security should never be balanced against one another. See 
Michaelsen, supra note 290, at 24 (“[A] simple balancing approach does not give adequate consideration to the 
philosophical and conceptual underpinnings of the notions of liberty and security. Liberty is a precondition of, 
and closely interrelated with, security. As a consequence, the two goods cannot be balanced against each other 
logically. Secondly, there are major rights-based objections against a simple balancing exercise. These include 
the jurisprudential problem of whether and to what extent civil liberties can be actually balanced against com-
munity interests. Other rights-based objections range from the difficulties of conceiving security as an individ-
ual right to the distributive character of the measures curtailing liberty themselves. It is not the entire popula-
tion which is trading off liberty for greater security but only certain parts of it. Thirdly, commentators invoking 
the balance metaphor to justify new security laws to counter the immediate dangers posed by terrorism do not 
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This comment does not suggest that the rights and values emphasized by 
the HCJ in the Haas, Beit Sourik, and Abu Safiyeh decisions were unfounded 
or morally wrong. This comment only points out the decisions in those cases 
turned—whether implicitly or explicitly—on the Court’s emphasis on the 
importance of human rights over security values in the balancing process. 
Moreover, the Court does not explain in a reasoned way, or in a way based on 
precedent, why the conflicting values should have such relative weights 
assigned to them. Therefore, the decisions are possibly tainted by arbitrariness 
and paternalism. Moving forward, the HCJ should pay closer attention to 
explaining and clarifying how it determines the relative weight of values, as it 
did in previous cases such as Horev. This will allow the Court to produce 
decisions in the future that fully provide all of the benefits of proportionality 




give appropriate weight to the long-term consequences of curtailing fundamental rights and liberties. Despite 
some possible short-term gains in security, some counter-measures may actually increase the potential for ter-
rorism and diminish security in the long run. Finally, detailed questions have to be asked as to whether a dimi-
nution of liberty actually enhances security or whether one is trading off civil liberties for symbolic gains and 
psychological comfort.”). 
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